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INTRODUCTION
In the many years since the passage of the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act1 its substantive provisions have gone unamended.2 The Act
proscribes concerted actions resulting in restraints of trade, or directed
toward achieving monopoly power and single-enterprise action4
directed toward achieving monopoly power or the exercise of existent
monopoly power already achieved. This is not to say that there has
not been considerable legislation enacted subsequent to the Sherman
Act proscribing both general and specific business enterprise activity
some of which might well have been read into the Sherman Act by
judicial interpretation.5 Particularly notable are the Federal Trade
Commission Act0 and the Clayton Act.7
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1 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1964).
2 The Miller-Tydings amendment, 50 Stat. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964), pro-
vided for special exemption for resale price maintenance contracts pursuant to valid
state laws. The maximum penalties for violation were increased from $5,000 to $50,000,
69 Stat. 282 (1955). By indirection the McGuire Act, 66 Stat. 632 (1952), 15 U.S.C.
§ 45 (1964), which became necessary to effectuate a complete exemption of resale price
maintenance remedies following the limitation read into the Miller-Tydings amendment
by Schwegmarm Brothers v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951), modified
the Sherman Act though it literally was an amendment to the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act, 38 Stat. 717 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1964). Hereinafter, the statute will be
referred to as the Sherman Act or as section 1 Sherman or section 2 Sherman when
referring to particular sections.
3 Both section 1 and section 2 of the Sherman Act proscribe concerted action. Sec-
tion 1 proscribes restraints of trade effected by "contract, combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy" and section 2 proscribes actions that "combine or
conspire... to monopolize."
4 Section 1 proscribes no action that is single or unilateral. Section 2, on the other
hand, in addition to proscribing group or concerted action, also proscribes single action
-"Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize." (Emphasis added.)
5 Some statutes of a substantive nature proscribing specialized business activity in-
dude Automobile Dealer Franchise Act, 70 Stat. 1125 (1956), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1225,
(1964); Bank Holding Co. Act, 70 Stat. 133 (1956), 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1844 (1964);
Connally Hot Oil Act, 49 Stat. 30 (1935), 15 U.S.C. §§ 715-715m (1964) ; Packers
and Stockyards Act, 42 Stat. 159 (1921), 7 U.S.C. §§ 181-229 (1964); Commodity
Exchange Act, 42 Stat. 998 (1922), 7 U.S.C. § 1 (1964). For a full list of legislation
affecting antitrust related trade-regulatory enactments see 4 TRADE REG. REPr. at
30002-003.
6 38 Stat. 717 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1964).
7 38 Stat. 738 (1914), 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1964).
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Although this writer has not researched the problem sufficiently
enough to enable an authoritative explanation, it would seem that
the phenomenon of enacting new legislation to curb alleged evils in
any area, rather than re-drafting the basic legislation concerned with
the problem area, is not limited to antitrust." Persons only minimally
acquainted with antitrust law will recognize that, absent attempts to
monopolize, or achieving monopoly, a restraint of trade effected by
single-enterprise action is not proscribed by the Sherman Act. What
comprises single-enterprise action, as contrasted with concerted
(group) action, is an area of dispute that has, as yet, not been
satisfactorily resolved.9 Settlement of the dispute by employing a
legal fiction which presumes that certain single-enterprise action is
concerted (group) action when it produces a restraint of trade,
flies so in the face of fact that it is unacceptable to some courts. 10
Short of accepting this legal fiction, the reported decisions fail to
produce any consistent guide for determining what factual patterns
of business activity can properly be labeled the result of contract,
combination, or conspiracy. 1
8 Familiar illustrations indude the Negotiable Instruments Act followed by the Bank
Collection Code; National Labor Relations Act followed by the Labor-Management
Relations Act; Interstate Transportation of Goods Act followed by the Lindberg Law;
and more closely connected to the subject at hand, the Federal Trade Commission Act
followed by the Truth in Packaging Act. Contra, amendment of the Clayton Act by ex-
panding section 2 to 2a, 2b, 2c, 2d, 2e to obtain the result desired though the change
is more popularly known as the Robinson-Patman Act, and the amendment of the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act to include the exceptions of the resale price maintenance con-
cepts more popularly known as the Miller-Tydings Act. A recent commentator writing
on the subject of reciprocity purchasing, and recognizing that this restraint to competi-
tive activity can likewise be effected through the tactic of refusal to deal, suggests new
specialized legislation to prohibit the activity. See Hausman, Reciprocal Dealing and the
Antitrust Laws, 77 HI.v. L. REV. 873, 883-84 (1964).
9 For some significant contributions toward a solution of the dispute see Rahl, Con-
spiracy and the Anti-Trust Laws, 44 ILL. L. Ray. 743 (1950); Stengel, Intra.Enterprise
Conspiracy Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 35 Miss. L.J. 5 (1963); Symposium,
Problems of Conspiracy-Problems of Combination, 1958 ANnTRUST LAW SYMpOsiUM
3; Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism
and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARv. L. REV. 655 (1962).
10 See, e.g., Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d 911 (5th Cir.
1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953) (where the alleged concert was between offi-
cers of the Motorola Co.) ; Johnny Maddox Motor Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 202 F. Supp.
103 (W.D. Tex. 1960); Herren Candy Co. v. Curtis Candy Co., 153 F. Supp. 751
(N.D. Ga. 1957) (where the alleged concert was between the company, its sales man-
ager and route salesmen). For a conceptual discussion see Kramer, Does Concerted
Action Solely Between a Corporation and Its Officers Acting on Its Behalf in Unreason-
able Restraint of Interstate Commerce Violate Section I of the Sherman Act? 11 FED.
B.J. 130 (1951). Cf. United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 341 U.S. 593
(1951); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
11 See TR"An REG. REPT. under "Intra-Company or Organization Conspiracy."
J 1435, 2534-39 for a long list of irreconcilable cases.
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Before proceeding further, the writer acknowledges the economic
doctrine presently supported by some, that no single-enterprise action,
absent monopoly, can effect a restraint of trade.12 For those who
accept this doctrine as realistic, the balance of this article will have
little or no meaning since a major premise for the following remarks
is that single-enterprise actions can and sometimes do effect restraints
of trade. Further, when measured by the rule of reason or the per
se doctrine applicable to concerted (group-produced) restraints, it
can be argued that single-enterprise actions deserve to be sanctioned
in a similar manner.
The doctrine that single-enterprise action cannot (absent mo-
nopoly) effect a restraint of trade presumes a structured economy of
the classical variety where buyers and sellers are so numerous and
each controls so little of the total market for the product, that indi-
vidual decisions produce no restraint on the economy; such de-
cisions are, in fact, the very life blood of the economy. The writer
submits that this doctrine is valuable primarily for discussions in
classroom economics, to contrast what could be with what is. When
conclusions based on a classical structured economy are used to
attempt to rationalize complete freedom of choice for the business-
man to determine his method of operation, the rationalization fails
because of the unrealistic foundation upon which it is based. No one
will suggest that a man can do business in any manner he pleases,
since legislation has long been in effect which proscribes, in general
terms, any concerted action by businessmen which restrains trade.13
The time is appropriate to consider whether additional legislation
should be passed which proscribes in general terms individual (non-
concerted) action if a restraint of trade results therefrom.
The word "generalize" is meaningful in relation to the problems
mentioned earlier-that specific new legislation often serves as a
12 Those adhering to this doctrine presuppose that the economy is of the "pure
competition" variety where single traders have no effect on price or market supply or
aggregate demand. Such assumptions are held by so few today, in view of the obvious
evidence of contrary conditions, as to be of negligible importance. All too often, how-
ever, conclusions drawn by those far too economically sophisticated to be classified as
belonging to the above described group can be traced to these false presuppositions.
The very lack of any proscribing language in the Sherman Act against individual non-
concerted activity, except where connected with monopoly activity, may be indicative
of conclusions of this nature.
13 See statute cited'note 1 supra (Section 1) ("Every contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade . . . is declared to be
illegal . . .").
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substitute for amendment to more generalized legislation. Conceding
the fact that Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act does in
fact provide an extremely general proscription against "unfair com-
petition" or "unfair or deceptive practices in commerce,"' 4 neverthe-
less the boundary of such proscription has most often been described
as encompassing only those restraints that are proscribed by sections 1
and 2 of the Sherman Act.15 Restraints, short of attempts to monop-
olize or monoply, by single-enterprise action are not within such
provisions. Conceivably, any single-enterprise action resulting in un-
reasonable restraints could be interdicted by Federal Trade Commis-
sion action. To reach this conclusion, one must first accept the premise
that all unreasonable restraints constitute "unfair competition" re-
gardless of the type of action-concerted or single-enterprise-used
to effect the unreasonable restraint. For those who are satisfied that
the Federal Trade Commission can and will exert sufficient control
over such restraints through issuance of cease and desist orders and
that such orders will be sustained when reviewed by the courts, a
complete answer to the problem is indicated. However, the treble
damage remedy, criminal complaints, and Justice Department civil
injunctive action should, in the writer's opinion, also be available to
provide the necessary deterrents to such undesirable business activity.
Furthermore, prohibition of certain specific business activity, whether
concerted or not, unfortunately seems to stimulate business to modify
its activity so as to achieve immunity while still producing the
undesirable restraints.
This writer suggests that a generalized prohibition of single-enter-
prise-created restraints of trade, despite the uncertainty that would
necessarily result from judicial interpretation, would prove a greater
14 38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1) (1964) ("Unfair
methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in com-
merce, are declared unlawful."). In 1938 the Wheeler-Lea Act added the language
relating to unfair and deceptive acts or practices in commerce. Such substantive addi-
tions were made necessary by the holding of the United States Supreme Court in FTC
v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643 (1931) when false claims made for an obesity cure were
found immune from the proscriptive language "unfair competition" for the reason that
no competitors of the product were harmed.
15 The Federal Trade Commission has no direct enforcement power over the provi-
sions of the Sherman Act. However, to the extent that any actions by those who are
subject to the proscriptions of the Sherman Act are violative of section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act, the Commission is authorized to issue cease and desist orders
prohibiting such activity. If the outer boundaries of section 5 do not include single-
enterprise action which effects a restraint of trade, then section 5 would have little
value in excess of the existing Sherman sections. See Arr'Y. GEN. NAT'L COMm. ANTI-
TRusT REPT. 374 (1955). The present state of the law is exhibited in the Supreme
Court's refusal to agree with the FTC that unilateral action, expressed as refusal to buy,
violated section 5 of the act. FTC v. Raymond Bros.-Clark Co., 263 U.S. 565 (1924).
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deterrent to undesirable business activity than any legislative attempt
to particularize what is and what is not permissible. This approach
might well meet with some degree of general acceptance, since busi-
nessmen and their legal advisers have not been particularly pleased
with the alleged certainty of particular prohibitions ;16 and moreover,
economists have seriously doubted the economic validity of some
attempts in this area.
17
The most serious problem in a general prohibition of single-enter-
prise restraints, as seen by the writer, would be the determination of
a measuring device by which single-enterprise activity could be
judged. This is so since it is necessary to perserve some semblance
of the freedom of choice which has been so necessary to our tra-
ditional concepts of a free business economy, and at the same time
protect the economy from undesirable restraints resulting from such
freedom of choice.
This article will endeavor to point up the particular areas where
existing trade legislation fails to prevent undesirable restraints. It
will also indicate where inconsistent reasoning becomes necessary to
reach the desired results, and suggest possible solutions with or
without legislative changes.
GENERAL ECONOMIC SETTING
Current economic structure includes manufacturers who sell di-
rectly to consumers, and retailers who manufacture their retail inven-
tory; however, such a vertically integrated characterization is properly
applicable only to a very limited portion of the economy. In contrast,
most goods reach consumers after having been manufactured by one
business enterprise, and having passed through numerous other
16 The famous or infamous amendment to the Clayton Act most popularly called the
Robinson-Patman Act, 38 Stat. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1964), is an example of
an attempt to particularize an activity that allegedly was anticompetitive in nature
(price discrimination). A wealth of critical comment exists. For those interested, a
bibliography of comments both critical and commendatory can be found in RowE,
PRICE DIscRImINATIoN UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN AcT (1962). See also the
Automobile Dealer Franchise Act, 70 Stat. 1125 (1956), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1225
(1964). Special attempts to exempt particular activity which would otherwise clearly
be anticompetitive activity has also resulted in legislation that can be criticized. See,
e.g., Small Business Act, 72 Stat. 384 (1958), 15 U.S.C. § 631 (1964); Bank Merger
Act Amendment of 1966, Pub. L. No. 356 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (Feb. 21, 1966); In-
surance Anti-Trust Moratorium Act, 59 Stat. 33 (1945), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015
(1964); ("Professional Sports Telecasting, Football Merger," 75 Stat. 732 (1961), as
amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1964)).
17 Among those whose comments are most incisive concerning the Robinson-Patman
Act's deficiencies are M. A. Adelman, Thomas H. Austern, Cyrus Austin, Corwin D.
Edwards, and Frederick Rowe.
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businesses during the process of distribution. Classification of the
levels of distribution as manufacturer, jobber, wholesaler, retailer,
etc., is today arbitrary; only an empirical study of the distribution
process within the industry being investigated will enable one to
understand the place in the distribution structure that is occupied by
a particular "wholesaler" or "distributor."'18 Many manufactured
items do not reach the consumer in the form in which they leave the
manufacturing enterprise; instead they often reach the consumer as a
component or sub-assembly of an entirely different product."9
The phrase "line of commerce" in the antitrust vernacular is a
way of describing the functional area within the economic structure
in which businesses operate.20 The retailer's line of commerce includes
both selling to consumers and buying from suppliers. The manu-
facturers' line of commerce includes selling to the enterprise next
in line in the distribution process or to another manufacturer who
will use the items as component parts; it also includes buying raw
materials and labor, and obtaining capital.
When the impact of single-enterprise restraints on competitors is
felt only in the line of commerce in which the one effecting the
restraint operates, economic theory has traditionally postulated that
the restraint is not serious, because the competitive disadvantages
suffered by the restrainor are normally sufficient to attenuate any
serious restraint. That is, a seller's sale to any buyer restrains another
seller from making a sale of that item to the buyer to the extent the
buyer wants but one of the item. This restraint on his fellow com-
petitor is permissible, thus sellers normally can set prices for products
they sell. A seller who fails to make the proposed sale attractive to
the buyer by demanding too high a price is always faced with the
possibility that other sellers competing for the same demand will
obtain the sale by offering a more attractive price or product. How-
ever, this oversimplified explanation of competition as a built-in
18 Cf. Teele, Logics and Emotions in Marketing, in McNAm & HANSEN, READINGS
IN MARKETING 314, 316.
19 A few examples of such consumer products are: the tires, paint and glass in auto-
mobiles; small gasoline motors in lawn mowers; television tubes in receiving sets; and
electric motors in motorized small tools.
20 Establishing the boundaries of lines of commerce becomes an important part of
every antitrust suit charging harm to competition, tendency to create a monopoly, or
monopoly. The term "relevant market" is used to describe the content of the line of
commerce. The process necessarily involves including or excluding particular geo-
graphical and product areas. Often the most significant issue before the court is delin-
eating exactly what line of commerce is being affected anticompetitively by the de-
fendant's activity.
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deterrent to a seller's arbitrary determination of the price of his
goods is much less effective in deterring unreasonable restraints when
conditions of sale other than price are agreed upon by sellers and
buyers. Recognizing this, conditions in a sales agreement (1) that
the purchaser refrain from purchasing from a competitor of the
seller, (2) that the purchaser buy all his needs from the seller, and/or
(3) that the buyer purchase an unwanted item along with the de-
sired item, are specifically prohibited by Section 3 of the Clayton
Act.
21
In reality, conditions of a sale of the variety stated above produce
restraints on other firms competing with the seller as well as re-
straints on the buyer. Thus, the seller's conditions of sale produce a
restraint of trade in both the seller's line of commerce and the buyer's
line of commerce. Most business enterprises can thus effect restraints
in two lines of commerce by means of the conditions under which
they are willing to sell. It should be pointed out that where buyer
purchasing power is sufficient to control the provisions of the sales
agreement, conditions requested by the buyer can similarly effect
restraints in both buyer's and seller's lines of commerce.22 Here again
the buyer's simple condition of purchase, that the price be agreeable,
is admittedly his own arbitrary choice. Despite the fact that such
buyer-produced restraints are possible, these restraints are not spe-
cifically prohibited under Section 3 of the Clayton Act.23 Furthermore,
a simple refusal to buy and a simple refusal to sell are apparently not
21 The specific language of Section 3 of the Clayton Act prohibits only the condi-
tion that the buyer "shall not use or deal in the goods . . . of a competitor . . . of
the seller . . ." when such condition accompanies, or is a part of the sales transaction
between seller and buyer. In addition, the effect of the sales transaction accompanied
by the specified condition must be "to substantially lessen competition or tend to create
a monopoly in any line of commerce" before the activity becomes unlawful. However,
court interpretation has resulted in determinations that agreements by buyers to pur-
chase their requirements for operation of their businesses, as well as agreements that
they will purchase an item (usually not desired by them) along with the item desired,
also has the effect of denying them the freedom to use or deal with competitors of the
seller, thus, such conditions are equally proscribed. United States v. Richfield Oil Corp.,
99 F. Supp. 280 (S.D. Cal. 1951), affd per curiam 343 U.S. 922 (1952) (requirements
contracts) ; International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947) (tying agree-
ments).
22 When buyers are sufficiently strong to induce sellers to agree to refrain from sell-
ing to competitors of the buyer, such an agreement forecloses the buyer's competitors
from competing with the buyer because of their inability to obtain the product of the
seller, and also eliminates the seller as a competitor of other sellers in the seller's line
of commerce.
23 The Clayton Act language applies only where the obligation to cease dealing with
another is an obligation of the buyer or lessee, and makes no mention of the factual
pattern where the seller or lessor is restrained in his future sales or leases.
1967]
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4
violations of the specific prohibitions of section 3 Clayton or section 1
Sherman.2
An argument can be made that the loss of the sale or purchase
accompanying the seller's refusal to sell or the buyer's refusal to
buy provides the necessary deterrent to exercise of this tactic as a
means of effecting unreasonable restraints of trade. The refusal to
sell allows the sale to be made by the seller's competitors, and the
refusal to buy allows the buyers' competitor to obtain the product.
A brief illustration reveals the weakness of the argument. A retailer
of multi-brand merchandise of competing manufacturers finds it
essential, for maximization of his competitive potential as a retailer,
to be able to carry in his inventory all or many competitive brands.
To the extent that the retailer is prohibited from marketing a given
brand (by seller refusal to sell to him), consumers are forced to
rely solely on interproduct competition rather than intraproduct
competition among several retailers carrying the same manufacturer's
brand.25 If a manufacturer or distributor (M) determines for reasons
24 This conclusion is stated at this point in the article as a proposition. Whether a
simple refusal to sell or buy results from the factual patterns of the cases becomes an
intricate problem with which much of this paper is concerned.
25 One writer categorically states that the statement of the issue in terms of intra-
brand versus interbrand competition is a fallacious way of posing the problem. Cf.
Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division,
75 YALE L.J. 375, 472 (1966). His conclusion is that all vertical restraints are non-
productive of anticompetitive effect, and the measuring device for determining the
need for proscription of business activity is whether such activity restricts output. He
further concludes that contract restraints similar to integration restraints should be
measured by the same formula-degree of market power. His analysis is that a pro-
ducer-distributor system bound together through contract restraints that preclude intra-
brand competition is a unit that must face interproduct competition or fail to survive
as an economic unit. Therefore, the traditional laws of economics will preclude the
unit from ever seeking inefficient methods of production or distribution. The net effect
will never result in a restriction of output. He also points out that correction of in-
efficiencies resulting from mistakes of the producer-distributor unit are not the ineffi-
ciencies the antitrust laws are designed to prevent.
This writer is impressed with, but not convinced by, the theoretical position of Pro-
fessor Bork. Mistakes of producers in judging the efficiencies of their distributors, and
distributors of their retailers etc., which can occur despite the resultant competitive
harm which will ultimately reflect on the producer's capability to remain in business
should not be encouraged. When a producer has received his reward for his part in the
economic process by sale of his product to a reseller, his function should be ended. At
this point the next purchaser should be able to pit one reseller against another to ob-
tain the advantages of competition in this line of commerce. Rivalry among resellers
should continue until the product reaches the end user. Rapidly changing conditions
cause consumer demand to differ widely from wholesaler or distributor demand for a
product. Resale price maintenance or other vertical restraints which prohibit the free
interplay of competitive forces on all levels of distribution can produce rigid price
structures in the short-run effect to the disadvantage of the consumer. The producer's
sensitivity to the consumer-demand changes is far less likely to produce output changes
or price changes if the producer has already received his reward. Should a producer
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unto himself that Retailer I should not be allowed to sell Ms product,
then the consumer must look to Retailer 2 to whom M is willing
to sell. Conceivably Retailer 2 has no incentive or need to price the
product of M competitively since Retailer 2 is immunized from the
competition of Retailer 1. What conceivable reasons would motivate
M'S refusal to sell to Retailer 1? Many have been offered: Bad mer-
chandising of "our" product; pricing the product below that which
the seller prefers it to be resold; failure to service the product satis-
factorily; degrading the product; the low public image of the
retailer; and oversaturization of the available sales outlets. 26
Some sellers, unwilling to suffer the ultimate disadvantage of loss
of sales resulting from a refusal to sell when buyers are unwilling to
accept the desired conditions, or, on the other hand, unwilling to
chance the antitrust risks of contracting with buyers under conditions
prohibited by section 3 Clayton, have used other devices to accom-
plish the same results. The consignment device allows the seller to
retain title until the goods pass from the retailer to the consumer.
This has the effect of subjecting the retailer to the control of the seller
and enables the conditions of the resale to be controlled, including
the price. This device has been held both valid27 and invalid28 as a
method of determining ultimate conditions of resale.
Hopefully, the reader will at this point discern that the writer is
suggesting that in order to avoid serious restraints of trade effected
by single-enterprise activity, the economic structure of our distribution
system requires that all distributors have equal nondiscriminatory
access to competing products. This will enable each distributor to
perform at his maximum competitive potential. How to balance the
need for such access with the interest the manufacturer or distributor
has in choosing who is to handle the product constitutes the problem,
as yet unsolved.
integrate and operate multiple retailer distribution outlets, it is suggested that he then
will be close to consumer demand. Where he faces interbrand competition, he will un-
doubtedly find himself selling his own product at different prices in different locations,
or at different times, or having to adopt other competitive tactics to meet a changing
price structure, or the competitive tactics of his competitor. This does not occur when
sellers are far removed from the retail market, as they must be in nationally-distributed
products. Thus, contract vertical restraints can result in far more rigid price structures
over longer periods of time than complete integration.
26 See the long list of business-offered reasons listed in Lockard & Sacks, The Rele-
vance of Economic Factors in Determining Whether Exclusive Arrangements Violate
Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 65 HARv. L. Rav. 913, 921-22 (1952).
27 United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926).
28 Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
1967]
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW[
The reciprocal problem of how to achieve for the manufacturer or
distributor a market for his product where single-enterprise refusal
to buy is motivated by a desire to effect some restraint on some line of
commerce must not be overlooked. Whether there are here considera-
tions of a different nature requiring different solutions will be dis-
cussed later in the article.
It is now appropriate to discuss specific factual situations where
serious restraints of trade, in the writer's opinion, were effected;
some of these restraints remained unprohibited by existing antitrust
legislation as interpreted by the court decisions.
SINGLE-ENTERPRISE DECISIONS-WHAT IS INCLUDED?
In all probability, most business activity results from single-enter-
prise decisions. Clear-cut examples include decisions to hire and fire
personnel, to expand or restrict plants, to regulate production sched-
ules and to make announcements of price or product quality changes.
So long as such decisions are not made in concert with competitors,
any ensuing restraints on competition are acceptable, despite the fact
that some of these decisions might not have been made if the requi-
sites of pure competition have been assumed. 9 Pressures from com-
petitors in the form of competitive action which motivate single-
enterprise decisions do not thereby make such single-enterprise de-
cisions concerted. If X lowers the price of his product and the
action motivates Y to lower the price of his product, Y's decision
should still be properly classified as a single-enterprise decision.80
29 For instance, a price announcement that exceeded "market price" or which was
below "market price" would never be made according to classical economic theory if
the requisites of pure competition existed. No seller can sell above the price which the
market has determined, nor would he be prevented from selling all he could produce
at the existing market price; so, no inducement to reduce his price below market would
exist. Businesses are thus relekated to adjusting their output to the point where their
marginal costs equal marginal revenue. Businessmen and all others having any sophisti-
cation realize that4 instead, decisions to raise or lower prices irrespective of what may be
the "market price" (if there is such a thing) are made every day. Nonbelievers should
consult BANI, PRICING DISmmUON AND EMPLOYMENT (1948); STIGLER, TnE
THEORY OF PiUCE (rev. ed. 1952).
30 Price reductions made by X to enable him to obtain a greater share of a limited
market (which existed at the fictional "market price") has the economic effect of in-
ducing X's competitior (Y) to reduce his price in order to maintain Y's existing share
of the limited market. Even an announcement by one to the other that certain activity
by one will produce a corresponding action by the other is not in most cases the agreed
exchange for the announcement. Since there is no obligation to take the action, there
is no basis for a charge that the action was concerted. Assume that two businessmen
are engaged in a conversation. X says, "If I lower my price will you lower yours?"
Y replies, "I certainly will." Or X says, "If I increase my price will you increase
yours?" and Y replies, "I certainly will." Do either of these conversations necessarily
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So long as Y is free to react to X's action as Y chooses, then Y's
decision should be classified as nonconcerted.
This article is concerned with a special type of business decision
(that of refusal to deal or threat of refusal) having a direct impact
on the bargaining relationship between seller and buyer which results
in a possible unreasonable restraint of trade. Proper classification
of this type of decision as either a single-enterprise or a concerted de-
cision is essential in order to determine whether the decision is
proscribed by existing legislation, which prohibits only concerted
activity.31
Performance of any obligation resulting from agreement is con-
certed action. More particularly, any decision made by a seller result-
ing from agreement with other competitor-sellers or with buyers,
which agreement obligates the decision, compels us to properly
classify the decision as concerted. Moreover, the business decision to
refuse to deal could be the result of such an agreement. An agree-
ment between one or more competing sellers obligating one or more
to refuse to sell to a particular buyer upon the happening of a
result in contract, conspiracy or concert? Not necessarily. If all Y means, when he
states affirmatively that he will lower or raise his price respectively when X does, is
that he will need to lower it in the first case to preserve his share of the market and
will need to raise it in the second case to maximize his profit, his statement of his in-
tended future action is in no way the agreed exchange for X's action and simply repre-
sents an announcement of his intention which he may or may not exercise when X
actually raises or lowers his price. It is not promissory in nature and thus is not of a
concerted nature. Businessmen are not necessarily in concert simply because they inform
each other that future actions will follow. Naturally, the converse of the conclusions
herein stated would result from a characterization of the conversation that Y was
promising X in exchange for X's action that he, Y, would take similar action. That
two characterizations can be drawn from the conversation is all that the writer is say-
ing. Identical activity by competitors, which activity would not normally be possible
without concert, or activity that normal economic theories would contraindicate, cer-
tainly are suspect; but, concert is more than identity of action. Theatre Enterprises, Inc.
v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (1954); Interstate Circuit, Inc.
v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939); Rahl, Conspiracy and the Anti-Trust Laws, 44
ILL. L. R . 743 (1950).
31 When refusal to deal is a tactic chosen by a monopolist or one attempting to
become a monopolist, single-enterprise action is involved and can be prohibited under
existing legislation without concerted action. However, in these instances it is the activ-
ity of a monopolist or the activity of someone attempting to become one that is pro-
scribed, and any activity, not limited to refusal to deal, in such a context is illegal.
Where the refusal to deal is unaccompanied by monopoly overtones, single-enterprise
use of the tactic under either section 1 Sherman or section 3 Clayton must arise in a
context of agreement. Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act provides the
cease and desist sanction for unfair competition or unfair and deceptive practices in
commerce, and thus could be used to proscribe single-enterprise refusals to the extent
one is willing to admit the tactic meets the test of unfair competition or an unfair or
deceptive practice. The FTC has not made use of this argument.
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predetermined condition forces us to characterize the performance
of the agreement as concerted.
32
If the agreement were between the seller and competitors of the
seller's customer, performance of the obligation of the agreement
would still be a concerted decision.33 The concerted nature of the
decision stems from the obligation in the agreement and not from
the relation of the parties to it. Therefore, where the agreement does
not obligate the decision the decision is optional and nonconcerted.
Thus, the conclusion follows that a seller's decision to refuse to deal
can be properly classified as nonconcerted despite the fact that an
agreement exists between the seller and the buyer indicating to the
buyer that a refusal to deal may result should the buyer be unwilling
to abide by certain conditions. Failure of the buyer to meet the con-
ditions for continued dealing permits, rather than compels, the
seller to refuse further sales. In addition, where the sales agreement
obligates the seller to make future sales, the buyer's failure to meet
the conditions provides the seller who refuses to deal with a defense
to a buyer's action for breach of contract. 4 The refusal to deal still
remains an optional nonconcerted single-enterprise decision.
The business decision to refuse dealing, like any other decision,
requires motivation for its execution. However, supplying that
motivation cannot in and of itself be the controlling factor in the
process of characterizing the decision as concerted or nonconcerted.
If such were true, then the buyer's failure to meet conditions set by
the seller as conditions precedent to further dealing 'Would char-
acterize the execution of the decision to refuse to deal as concerted
action. Instead we logically conclude that the seller's refusal is simply
carrying out an announced threat-a nonconcerted decision. If we
32 For example, if X and Y are competing sellers, both selling his respective product
to Z, and an agreement between X and Y exists obligating both or one of them to
cease selling to Z if either learns that Z is purchasing products from A (a competitor
seller of X's and Y's), then X's and/or Y's refusal to sell to Z would be a concerted
refusal. Similarly, even though there had been no preexisting agreement to refuse deal-
ing if X and Y, on learning that Z was purchasing from A, which neither X nor Y
approved, and X and Y in consideration of each other's promise or act likewise promise
or act to refuse, such a refusal would be concerted. Klor's, Inc., v. Broadway-Hale
Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959); cf. United Shoppers Exclusive v. Broadway-Hale
Stores, Inc., TRADE RaG. RaP. (1966 Trade Case.) 71727 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 24,
1965).
aa Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., supra note 32.
34 Where the sales agreement in no way obligates the seller to any future sales (the
normal open-account sales agreement), the seller needs no defense to his refusals to
make further sales. He is simply refusing offers to purchase, and absent any specialized
situation requiring forced sales as might exist in a public utilities context, the seller's
power to refuse sales is the equivalent of his right to do so.
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assume a seller who is willing to continue dealing, but whose decision
to eliminate further sales to a buyer is induced or motivated by
economic pressure brought to bear on him by competitors of the buyer
-will such a refusal to sell be deemed concerted? Suppose a seller,
with an announced policy of not selling to buyers who resell below
an announced price, solicits and receives information from certain
buyers which indicates to the seller that other buyers are violating
the pricing policy. If he thereafter uses such information in reaching
his decision to refuse to sell to the violators, will such refusal, when
executed, constitute a concerted refusal ?35 This writer suggests that
refusals should not be classified as concerted unless the refusal to
deal results from a concurrent or preexisting obligation, derived from
an express or implied agreement calling for the refusal. The essence
of illegality of concerted action is that the parties have obligated
themselves to future action which leaves them no longer independent
decision makers. Such fettering can be accomplished in any form-
contract, combination, or conspiracy--but whatever the form, the
essence of the arrangement must be one leaving the parties obligated
rather than free to decide their future course of action. We can
readily see that the essence of concerted action is missing when we
have only (1) economic pressure on a seller who succumbs to the
pressure by refusing to deal, or (2) refusing to deal after receiving
aid from others who have a community of interest in goals to be
accomplished by refusing to deal. The writer realizes that the act
of refusing to deal, in the right circumstances could be proved to be
the acceptance of an offer for a unilateral contract made by those
buyers who exert pressure on the seller to refuse to deal with the
nonconforming buyer. Where those circumstances can be proved the
refusal becomes concerted within the writer's definition. 6 Likewise,
a promise express or implied to refuse to deal, made to anyone either
pressuring him or aiding him (made as a means of relieving the
35 These very facts have unfortunately been regarded- as sufficient to be characterized
as concert. FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922).
36 If a seller has not promised his buyers to refuse dealing with a price cutter in
return for their cooperation in reporting price cutting to him, it is highly unlikely that
his refusing to deal is both the act of performance and the acceptance of their promise
to him to perform some kind of future action such as continued purchases from him
provided he will refuse dealing to the disclosed price cutter. Only where his refusal is
both the performance of his obligation and the acceptance of their offer for a unilateral
contract, wherein they are promising something to be performed in the future in return
for his willingness to refuse dealing, would the refusal ever be properly classified as
the acceptance of an offer for a unilateral contract and thus become concerted. Other-
wise, in most cases, it is nothing but his optional unobligated carrying out of an an-
nounced plan.
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pressure or rewarding the aider) would make the refusal which
followed concerted, since the refusal would be merely the perform-
ance of an obligation.
Despite some court holdings to the contrary,37 it is also a thesis of
this article that single-enterprise decisions result whenever the de-
cisions are controlled by a single enterprise, regardless of whether
divisions, subsidiaries, or combinatipns of employees were originally
involved in reaching the decision. F r example, the decision to refuse
to deal arrived at after a joint discussion between the Vice President
of sales and the Regional Sales Manager is not a concerted refusal.
Neither would a conspiratorial refusal be effected if the President of
General Motors Corporation together with Pontiac and Chevrolet
Division Heads jointly decided that the Chevrolet Division will cease
sales to dealer X.
The writer will now attempt to show, by use of selected case
examples, that some judges, in their desire to prohibit vertical re-
straints of trade (traditionally recognized as per se unreasonable),
have irrationally classified refusals to deal as concerted in order to
bring them within the proscription of section 1 Sherman.
REFUSALS TO DEAL USED AS A TACTIC TO SUPPORT
RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE
The principle, first enunciated in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D.
Park & Sons Co.,"8 that vertical resale price agreements between sellers
and buyers constitute per se unreasonable restraints of trade pro-
hibited by section 1 Sherman was well entrenched by the time United
States v. Colgate & Co.3 9 was decided. However, the Supreme Court
in Colgate, adhering to correct doctrine (that nonconcerted action is
outside the prohibitory effect of section 1 Sherman), characterized
Colgate's refusal to deal as individual and nonconcerted and thus
immune from the section. Thus, immunity from section 1 depended
on the nonconcerted nature of the refusal to deal rather than the
lack of unreasonable restraint of trade resulting therefrom. The facts
in Colgate clearly showed that prior to the decision not to deal, the
37 Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); Kiefer-
Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951); Balian Ice Cream Co. v.
Arden Farms Co., 231 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 991 (1956);
Schoenberg Farms, Inc. v. Denver Milk Producers, Inc., 1964 Trade Cas. 79745 (D.
Colo.); Deterjet Corp. v. United Aircraft Corp., 1962 Trade Cas. 77276 (D. Del,);
United States v. Arkansas Fuel Oil Corp., 1960 Trade Cas. 76493 (N.D. Okla.).
38 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
39 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
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threat of refusal to deal had caused buyer conformance to resale
price maintenance, an admittedly unreasonable restraint of trade.
Certainly, after the decision which strengthened the threat by making
its execution permissible, the unreasonable restraint would continue.
One should not conclude too quickly that sellers desiring resale
price maintenance as a condition of selling were in the same economic
position following Colgate as they would have been under a valid
state resale price maintenance statute. Sales made with the hope of
buyer conformance to minimum resale prices might not produce con-
formance. Threats to refuse to deal might not produce conformance,
and ultimate refusal would result in loss of sales. Under resale
price maintenance statutes, nonconforming buyers (price cutters) can
be made defendants in a suit to recover damages while sales continue.
In extreme cases, buyers who are unwilling to accept resale price
maintenance could refuse to buy. Such a result is more likely in theory
than practice, for multiproduct buyers find it necessary to stock na-
tionally advertised brands to insure customer loyalty, whether re-
stricted by a resale price maintenance policy or not.
By the time it became necessary to decide Federal Trade Com-
mission v. Beech-Nut Packing Co.40 and United States v. Parke,
Davis & Co.,41 the Supreme Court, firmly committed to the proposi-
tion that vertical price fixing produced unreasonable restraints of
trade, and presumably chafing under the Colgate principle which
when properly used was an effective means of continuing the restraint,
was predisposed to find the prerequisite conspiracy or concert in
factual patterns that in no way obligated Beech-Nut or Parke, Davis,
as sellers, to refuse to deal. The refusals in both cases were noncon-
certed decisions made by the sellers as single-enterprise decisions.
Even in Parke, Davis there was no showing that the intermediate
wholesalers were obligated by agreements to terminate sales to price-
cutting retailers, though economic motivation to do so certainly
existed due to the threat of being cut off by Parke, Davis. Appar-
ently, the Court's desire to prohibit resale price maintenance was
strong enough to cause the Court to seriously undermine basic pre-
requisites for concerted action that were previously required to
effect a prohibition of activity under section 1 Sherman.
After these two cases, the Colgate principle was left practically an
empty shell, devoid of protective value when sellers sought shelter
40 257 U.S. 441 (1922).
41 362 US. 29 (1960).
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beneath it. A finding of cooperation from competitors of the price
cutters in informing the sellers of conditions which would afford them
facts from which to decide unilaterally whether they would refuse
future sales was all the Court needed to satisfy the requirement of
concert. In fact, Parke, Davis dropped the concept of concert and
chose to make the test of illegality the use of "other means which
effect adherence to his resale prices, ' 42 i.e., means other than simple
refusal to deal. The words "other means" simply reflected (1) ef-
fective use by seller of information sources to conclude that buyers
were not conforming to -conditions of resale, plus (2) economic
pressure against intermediate sellers who continued selling to price
cutters. In the writer's opinion, the accepted doctrine that resale price
maintenance as a vertical restraint is unreasonable 48 should not be
tolerated as a sufficient reason to emasculate principles of proper
classification of concerted versus single-enterprise activity.
Close analysis of Parke, Davis reveals that the Court was not con-
cerned with the restraint of trade caused by the actual refusal to deal
with the buyer, but instead was concerned that Parke, Davis by its
threats to refuse to deal with price cutters, could maintain an ef-
fective resale price maintenance system.44 Because the threats of
Parke; Davis were accompanied by a factual situation which made
the threat real rather than impotent, the likelihood of buyer con-
formance to suggested resale price maintenance became strong.
Unwilling to accept any effective method of compelling resale price
maintenance outside of the statutory exemption found in State resale-
price-maintenance-protection laws,45 the Court struck down a uni-
42 Id. at 44.
43 Most commentators, economic and legal, have agreed that resale price main-
tenance is anticompetitive. See, e.g., EDwARDs, MAINTAINING COMPETITION 72 (1949) ;
GRETHER, PRICE CONTROL UNDER FAIR TRADE LEGISLATION (1939); MUND, Gov-
ERNMENT AND BusNEss 461-85 (1955); Bowman, Resale Price Maintenance-A
Monopoly Problem, 25 U. CHI. J. Bus. 141 (1952); Fulda, Resale Price Maintenance,
21 U. CH. L. REV. 175 (1954); Rahl, Resale Price Maintenance, State Action, and the
Antitrust Laws, 46 ILL. L. REV. 349 (1951). Contra, Adams, Fair Trade and the Art
of Prestidigitation, 65 YALE L.J. 196 (1955); Adams, Resale Price Maintenance: Pact
and Fancy, 64 YALE Lj. 967 (1955); Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Con-
cept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 75 YALE 1j. 373, 397 (1966).
44 Nowhere in the opinion is there any emphasis or consideration placed on the
harmful anticompetitive effect of the price cutter's (Dart) inability to receive Parke-
Davis drugs for resale. Instead the court was solely concerned with the ability of Parke.
Davis, by its threats of refusal to deal, to maintain a program of resale price main-
tenance.
45 Other methods such as agency, consignment, or vertical integration were, of
course, not before the court. The Sherman Act by amendment has exempted vertical
price fixing where administered through state so-called "Fair Trade" statutes. The con-
sensus of present opinion that such statutes are anticompetitive has led in recent years
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lateral refusal to deal as a permissible business tactic when that
tactic was effectively used to produce a restraint traditionally accepted
as per se unreasonable.
The loss of the sale when a seller actually carries out a threat to
refuse to deal consitutes the built in competitive disadvantage which
may act as a deterrent to the seller's action. This inherent deterrent
may possibly be the underlying but unarticulated reason why many
courts find some refusals to deal "justifiable business activity." '46 How-
ever, when sellers use the threat of refusal to deal to maintain a
vertical resale price program and enforce the threat with actual re-
fusals, then unrealistically, a shift in thinking results and the refusals
themselves become illegal.
Sellers possessed of the naked power to refuse sales to buyers can
make effective use of the power to require buyer conformity to any
seller-desired condition. Enough litigation has occurred where the
seller-desired-condition has been resale price maintenance to enable
us to observe whether the results of the litigation conform to the
principles of Parke, Davis.
If consistency is a proper measure of satisfaction, the results of this
litigation are far from satisfactory. For example, in Dart Drug Corp.
v. Parke, Davis & Co.,47 a private suit seeking treble damages, the
plaintiff was the same price cutter involved earlier in the action by
the Government in Parke, Davis, and the suit concerned a refusal
by defendant to deal with plaintiff which occurred subsequent to the
refusal to deal which formed the basis for the suit in Parke, Davis.
Plaintiff lost this suit when the summary judgment awarded Parke,
Davis by the lower court was affirmed in the court of appeals.
to a reexamination of them in many contested cases. A significant number of state
courts have found their statutes unenforceable or unconstitutional. See 2 TRaDE REG.
RaP. ff 6041.
40 The fact that clear unilateral refusal to deal is unproscribed does not bother the
courts at all when they conclude that the reason given by the businessman for his re-
fusal is one that any businessman would be "justified" in using as the motivation for
his refusal. In fact, when the reason given for the refusal falls within the area of
"justifiable reasons" some courts are uninterested in factual patterns that clearly show
the refusal may have been concerted. Schwing Motor Co. v. Hudson Sales Corp., 138
F. Supp. 899, 906 (D. Md.) af/'d per curiam, 239 F.2d 176 (4th Cir. 1956), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 823 (1957). Concentration on the reasons given for the refusal can
result in those courts' failure to concentrate on the effect the refusal has on competition.
See discussion of the court in McKesson & Robbins, Inc. v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 235
F. Supp. 743, 747 (E.D. Pa. 1964), where the court, though holding the refusal of the
defendant conspiratorial, distinguished individual nonconcerted refusals based on
"sound business reasons."
47 221 F. Supp. 948 (D.D.C. 1963), af/'d, 344 F.2d 173 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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Plaintiff failed to allege any new conspiracy connected with the re-
fusal to deal, and the court, relying on Colgate, characterized Parke,
Davis' refusal to deal as a permissible single-enterprise tactic despite
its obvious effect of inducing other buyers to conform to resale price
maintenance conditions. In an action for treble damages, a buyer who
fails to allege conspiracy or concert (thus technically failing to bring
the defendant's activity within the proscriptions of section I Sher-
man) has only himself to blame. This is especially true where proof
of the "concert" according to the Parke, Davis doctrine can be so
easily proved by showing that "other means" have been utilized to
maintain the resale price policy.
Allegations of conspiracy were made in the complaint in Klein
v. American Luggage Works,48 a treble damage action brought by
Klein (the price cutter) against American Luggage Works (the
seller who refused to deal). Klein based the conspiracy charge on
the fact that information had been supplied by competitors of Klein
to a sales representative of American Luggage Works that "someone"
was price cutting. An independent and unrelated investigation by
American Luggage Works revealed Klein's price cutting, and the
refusal to deal followed soon thereafter. The trial court found
sufficient evidence of "other means," invoked the Parke, Davis doc-
trine, and awarded judgment to the plaintiff. Reversing, the circuit
court of appeals49 was apparently unconvinced that American Lug-
gage Works' refusal to deal was anything more than nonconcerted
action. Because information about Klein's price-cutting activities
did not motivate in any way the seller's refusal to sell, the seller and
the informers were not held to have conspired. The only "other
means" used by American Luggage Works was extensive literature
distributed to buyers indicating the company's established policy
that the product was to be sold at preticketed prices. The appellate
court treated this as a mere announcement by American Luggage
Works that failure to follow preticketed prices on resale would
result in refusal to deal. The holding is consistent with the writer's
thesis with respect to nonconcerted refusals to deal. However, the
implications derived from the reasoning of the appellate court are
not consistent. Clearly, if the information conveyed to the sales
representative of American Luggage Works had been communicated
to his superiors and had formed the basis for the refusal to deal, the
court's rationale would have required a finding that the refusal was
48 206 F. Supp. 924 (D. Del. 1962).
49 323 F.2d 787 (3rd Cir. 1963).
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concerted.50 Such a conclusion is contrary to the writer's thesis, which
would not find concerted action so long as the seller's refusal to deal
was exercised optionally.
Contrasted with Klein and Dart, wherein refusals to deal were not
construed to be violative of section 1 Sherman, refusals to deal were
held to be violations in the following three cases. In Geo. Warner
v. Black and Decker Mfg. Co., 1 Warner (a wholesale distributor)
was told by Black and Decker (his supplier) to maintain certain
resale prices in bidding for Government purchases of the product.
No agreement restricting Warner's bidding practices was ever
reached. Warner bid for Government purchases at prices below those
Black and Decker suggested. He was warned, and Black and Decker
eventually refused further sales to him. Warner sued for treble
damages alleging a violation of section 1 Sherman charging con-
spiracy in his complaint (claiming that agreements for vertical price
fixing existed between Black and Decker and other distributors). In
reversing the district court's dismissal of the complaint, the circuit
court made it clear that it was only deciding that an allegation of
conspiracy by Warner should allow him his day in court to prove
the charge.5 2 The decision certainly can be read as approving the
principle that refusal to deal, unaccompanied by "much else," is
illegal when used to perpetuate a resale price maintenance policy.
A much dearer case which supports the proposition that non-
concerted refusals to deal are illegal under section 1 Sherman is
A. C. Becken v. Gemex Corp. 3 Though this case was decided shortly
before Parke, Davis, the Gemex court recognized the existence of
Colgate and Beech-Nut and attempted to reach a decision consistent
with both. Plaintiff Becken was a wholesaler supplied by Gemex,
a manufacturer of watchbands. The evidence clearly showed that
Gemex had attempted to persuade Becken to resell the watchbands
and other products which he stocked at prices set by the respective
manufacturers. Becken steadfastly refused to comply, and eventu-
ally Gemex refused to make further sales of watchbands. The lower
court found a unilateral refusal to deal and also found no proof
of damage. 4 Reversing, the circuit court of appeals found not only
the existence of a cause of action for treble damages due to viola-
GO Id. at 791.
r" 172 F. Supp. 221 (E.D.N.Y. 1959).
52 277 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1960).
53 272 F.2d I (7th Cir. 1959).
r4 1959 Trade Cas. 75224 (N.D. I1.).
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tion of section 1 Sherman; but also found damages in excess of
$5,ooo.005O The judge, after reviewing the cases including Beech-
Nut, concluded: "A wrench can be used to turn nuts and bolts but
it can also be used to assault persons. Like a wrench, a manufacturer's
right to stop selling to a wholesaler can be used legitimately; but it
may not be used to accomplish an unlawful purpose." Following
this question-begging analogy, he continued by showing that Gemex
clearly had a plan to sell only to those who maintained manufacturer-
established prices. Designating the plan an agreement, and con-
cluding that the agreement obligated the refusal to deal, the judge
found the refusal to be concerted and in violation of section 1
Sherman. In reference to the wrench-assault analogy, it is clear that
an assault alone is illegal and that the weapon used is not a requisite
of illegality. On the other hand, an unreasonable restraint of trade
in and of itself is not illegal under section 1 Sherman. 7 The
"weapon" used to effect it must be a "concerted" weapon. The re-
fusal to deal by Gemex was only the execution of a predetermined
plan and the plan was not an agreement obligating Gemex in any
way. Thus it could be argued that the case was decided erroneously. "8
The third case where refusal to deal resulted in a holding that
section 1 Sherman had been violated involved a much more complex
factual pattern.59 The Union Oil Company, selling its products
through a consignment sales plan to retailer Simpson on leased land,
failed to renew Simpson's lease, admitting that its refusal was based
solely on Simpson's unwillingness to maintain retail prices set by
55 A. C. Becken Co. v. Gemex Corp., 272 F.2d at 5.
56 Id. at 4.
57 Ibid.
58 The case has an interesting history besides the question of substantive violation of
the Sherman Act. Appealed twice to the circuit court, 314 F.2d 839 (7th Cir. 1963),
and 272 F.2d I (7th Cir. 1959), and treated three times at the trial court level, 204
F. Supp. 28 (N.D. Ill. 1962), 199 F. Supp. 544 (N.D. Ill. 1961), and 1959 Trade
Cas. 75224 (N.D. Ill.), the Supreme Court also denied certiorari, 375 U.S. 816
(1963), from the latest circuit court opinion. As a result of all this litigation it was
determined that (1) there was no conspiracy (and of course there was no combination
or contract), but there was a violation of section 1 Sherman, 314 F.2d at 843; and
(2) lost profits occurring after commencement of the suit but proximately caused by
reason of refusals to sell occurring before commencement of the suit are admissable as
evidence of damages recoverable. Id. at 842-43. When such profits would again resume,
absent proof of a willingness to resume unconditional sales by Gemex, is problematical.
Apparently, the court was unwilling to agree that a salesman's attempt to get Becken
to resume purchases terminated the time for measuring the damages resulting from the
first refusal. This conclusion was reached because the court found that the salesman did
not make it clear that the sales would be made without any conditions of resale pricing.
Id. at 840.
59 Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
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Union Oil. After unsuccessful attempts to obtain possession of the
leased land using state property law concepts relating to landlord-
tenant law, Simpson brought a treble damage action against Union
Oil, alleging violation of section 1 Sherman. Though Union Oil
offered as a defense to the action that retailer price control was
permissible through the device of consignment, it also alleged as a
defense that it had unilaterally refused to deal-permissible conduct
under Colgate. Reaching the United States Supreme Court on appeal
from the decision that no damages were provable, 0 the Supreme
Court, with one Justice dissenting and two others filing a memo-
randum relative only to the issue of consignment as a resale pricing
device, concluded that neither defense was supportable. The ma-
jority decision appeared unconcerned with the need for proof of
any agreement that obligated the seller to refuse to deal or at least
did not articulate any need for concert in the decision of Union Oil
to refuse further sales.
Clearly, there was an agreement to maintain resale prices through
the consignment device, but Simpson is not the case of a seller suing
the buyer for violation of the resale price maintenance agreement
and being met with a defense that the agreement is a violation of
section 1 Sherman. Nor is it the case of a party to an illegal price
fixing agreement suing another party to the agreement charging il-
legality of the agreement and resultant damage. Instead, it is our
familiar fact pattern-a seller exercising his power of refusal to
sell as the means of coercing buyers to live up to the resale price
maintenance conditions of their agreements and then61 being sued
by his customer for refusal to sell.
One student writer seriously attempts to breathe new life into the
words "combination in the form of trust or otherwise" appearing
in section 1 Sherman as a way of explaining Simpson's lack of need
for contract or conspiracy to bring the fact pattern within the pro-
scriptions of the Act.62 If it were not more logical to explain Simpson
60 311 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1963).
101 The theory of Simpson's case was that he had been injured by reason of Union
Oil Co.'s refusal to renew his lease. Since failure to renew the lease had the same effect
as refusal to sell gasoline to Simpson, the case is a clear refusal-to-sell situation. The
final chapter in this litigation has not been written. At the date of this writing Simp-
son has most recently been rebuffed by the United States Supreme Court in his attempts
to prevent the trial court from carrying out a pre-trial order allowing the defendant to
show "equities" warranting only a prospective application of the Simpson doctrine.
Simpson v. District Court, TRADE R G. REP. (1966 Trade Cas.) f 67100, at 75097
(U.S. Oct. 10, 1966).
62 Comment, "Combination" in Restraint of Trade: A New Approach to Section 1
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as simply further evidence of inconsistency concerning the need for
the element of concert in cases where the court is committed to the
proposition that the restraint must be prohibited, this writer might
be willing to accept a portion of that thesis.
63
The first premise of the student's thesis appears to be that the
existence of two or more firms related to each other, either hori-
zontally as competitors or vertically as seller-buyer, meets the pre-
requisite of a "combination" as that word is used in section 1
Sherman. The second premise states that when one of the firms
acts, or makes a business decision, this is in fact the decision of the
combination; if the action results in restraint of trade, section 1
Sherman is violated. Such a thesis appears to be a pure fiction to
enable section 1 Sherman, without the necessity for amendment, to
encompass single-enterprise activity which restrains trade. If one
is committed to the theory that single-enterprise activity can produce
unreasonable restraints of trade, as is this writer, then the student's
thesis accomplishes that result, and to that extent is approved. How-
ever, the fiction that the mere existence of two firms constitutes a
of the Sherman Act, 1966 UTAH L. REV. 75. Mr. McDonald's conclusions are that, after
eliminating all other possible agreements or conspiracies that the court could have
relied on in Simpson the court was left with but one solution. Treat the "combination"
consisting of the mere existence of two firms (Union Oil Co. and Simpson) as meeting
the language of section 1 Sherman "combinations in the form of trust or otherwise."
(Emphasis added.) Then, any activity of either firm restraining trade is "a combination
restraining trade." No language in the opinion uses this analysis and the analysis seems
to this writer a strained, but possible, approach to all refusals to deal that are essen-
tially unilateral. If, used as explanatory of Simpson, the "combination" seems to this
writer to be more apparent as a description of the multiple-party arrangement existing
between all the other Union Oil lessees and the Union Oil Company. There was no
evidence, however, of an obligation on Union Oil Co. in the terms of the common
lease provisions obligating Union Oil Co. to cancel leases of lessees who failed to abide
by the directed resale prices. Thus within the thesis of this article, the action was
single-business-enterprise activity. Lessees bound by consignment pricing would, how-
ever, clearly benefit only to the extent that Union Oil Co. would enforce the pricing
system, and could naturally expect Union to choose the tactic of refusal to deal as its
sanction to coerce enforcement. This writer agrees wholeheartedly with McDonald that
"an inspection of the refusal-to-deal cases as a whole will reveal that there is no cor-
relation between evidence of agreement and the result of the cases; any attempt to re-
concile these cases on the basis of agreement is impossible. However, there is some
correlation between the gravity of the restraint and the finding of illegality." Id. at 83.
63 His condusion that when a price fixing results from "combination" rather than
from contract or conspiracy such result can be considered subject to the rule of reason
standard rather than the per se rule seems illogical. Id. at 89. If, as McDonald suggests
in his explanation of Simpson, the "combination" consists of the mere existence of the
Union Oil Co. plus Simpson, and that Union Oil is the entity in the combination that
sets the price, then such a "combination" setting the price should be per se a violation
of section I Sherman. Grammatically, the restraint of trade proscribed by section 1
Sherman is one caused by contract, combination, or conspiracy and it is the nature of
the restraint, not the form of the organization which caused the restraint, that deter-
mines the per se characterization.
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combination, and action by one supplies the concert requirement of
Sherman, is unacceptable. The action of one of two competitors is
not the concerted action of both, nor is the action of a seller in a
seller-buyer combination the action of both. It is submitted that the
word "combination" in section 1 Sherman, especially as modified by
"in the form of trust or otherwise" was merely Congress' method
for attempting to prohibit group or concerted action regardless of
the form that the group takes. 4
Threats to refuse dealing to coerce resale price maintenance
against recalcitrant customers are effective only if the threat can be
carried out without legal liability. Where refusals to deal in such
cases are nonconcerted they are not proscribed by section 1 Sherman.
If resale price maintenance is an unreasonable restraint of trade it
should be prohibited regardless of the method used to maintain it.
Perhaps courts, desirous of reaching a rational solution to the prob-
lem of preventing unreasonable restraints, should not be blamed for
expanding the concept of concerted action beyond its proper limits.
An examination of refusals to deal when used as a business tactic
to coerce other kinds of anticompetitive activity on customers may
aid in clarifying the need for a better solution.
REFUSALS TO DEAL USED AS A TACTIC TO SUPPORT ANTI-
COMPETITVE CONDITIONS OTm R TiAN RESALE
PRICE MAINTENANCE
1. Refusals Used to Coerce Conditions Which Would Be a Viola-
tion of Section 3 Clayton if Incorporated in an Agreement Be-
tween Seller and Buyer
Sellers who desire as a condition of sales or leases to customers
that the customers refrain from dealing with competitors of the
64 Another explanation for the choice of '"combination" as a form by which a re-
straint could be effected that should be prohibited was suggested by Mr. Justice Holmes
in his dissenting opinion in Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
There, he forecast the problem presently covered by Section 7 of the Clayton Act which
disallows mergers by acquisition of stock of another corporation or consolidation of two
or more companies by a holding company's purchase of sufficient stock to control the
two companies. He felt that when the action consisted of a consolidation of the stock
control of two or more companies it was clear that competition between them would
cease. He thus forecast the problems of the first version of Section 7 of the Clayton Act
which had for its proscriptive test that competition between the acquired and acquiring
company should not be substantially lessened. This was, of course, always the result of
the combination. If the relevant market in the Northern Securities case was the trans-
portation in the geographic area where the Great Northern and Northern Pacific rail-
roads had formerly operated as competitors, the merger through consolidation of their
stock into holding company control would clearly violate both section 1 and section 2
Sherman.
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seller, or purchase additional goods along with the desired product,
have sometimes incorporated these conditions in the lease or sale,
either in the form of promises by buyers to comply, or as conditions
precedent to future sales to the customers. Remedies available to
these sellers in the event the buyers fail to comply with the terms
of the agreement would appear to be (1) a suit for breach of con-
tract and (2) refusal to continue selling. However, where agreements
accompanying the sales or leases contain promises or conditions, and
where the effect of the sales or leases so accompanied tends to sub-
stantially lessen competition, or tends to create a monopoly, the
agreements violate section 3 Clayton. Sellers who attempt to enforce
the agreements would be met with the defense of an illegal contract.
If the seller attempts to enforce compliance by a refusal to sell,
he will undoubtedly be met with a treble damage action filed by
the buyer who feels the brunt of the refusal; whether or not the
seller refuses to sell, the mere existence of the agreement could
subject such sellers to Government suit by the Justice Department
seeking to enjoin the agreement. In addition, the seller would be
exposed to the possibility of a cease and desist order by the Federal
Trade Commission, which, if disobeyed, would subject the seller to
a fine.
Many sellers, unwilling to risk the above outlined undesirable
consequences without any real advantages to be derived from the
presence of the agreement, have preferred to make their sales and
leases unconditional and to exercise their right to refuse future deal-
ing upon a determination that the buyers have engaged in purchases
from competitors or have not purchased the products desired by the
seller to be sold along with the primary product. In the latter situa-
tion, sellers simply refuse offers to purchase, unless the offers include
offers to buy the products which consist of the "tied" combination.
Justification for the refusals to sell stem from the Colgate doctrine.
Choice of one's customer is a decision to be made by the seller, and
his choice is immune from antitrust illegality provided he is neither
a monopolist nor attempting to become one, and provided his choice
is not the result of a concerted decisibn. Is consistency in the appli-
cation of the "concert prerequisite" any more evident in this type
of case than in the refusal-type case where the condition sought to
be imposed on the buyers was resale price maintenance? There may
be a bit more consistency; however, viewing the whole situation,
the cases appear to have completely ignored the concert prerequisite.
[Vol. 4
ANTITRUST REFUSALS TO DEAL
An analysis of some selected cases will show that refusals to deal
have been described as evidencing an understanding of a preexisting
sales policy which in itself is a violation of section 3 Clayton.65
More specifically, when buyers fail to comply with desired condi-
tions, which conditions form no part of an agreement between the
seller and buyer, and the seller refuses future sales, the courts have
found that the conditions were in fact a part of an understanding.
It is only natural for businessmen whose primary objective is to con-
tinue selling to indicate to buyers the conditions under which they
will continue to deal. Such an announcement is the businessman's
way of coercing compliance with the conditions. To call it coercion,
which it clearly is, is not also to call it concert, which it clearly is
not. Nor is properly calling it coercion the same thing as labeling
it the result of agreement between seller and buyer, when buyers
refuse to promise to abide by the conditions and are not asked for
any promises. Most of the cases under this classification involve
threats to refuse dealing which have effectively coerced the buyer into
compliance for fear of having his source of supply cut off. Threats
to refuse dealing are just as effective a means of obtaining compliance
as the use of conditions which would have been illegal under section
3 Clayton had they appeared in the form of an agreement.
Frustrated in their attempts to prevent unreasonable restraints
of trade by the limited scope of section 3 Clayton (which requires
an agreement), the courts have tended to find an agreement where
65 Section 3 Clayton is a legislative attempt to prevent powerful sellers from exert-
ing their superior bargaining power to induce buyers into agreeing that the buyers will
not purchase their needs from competitors of the seller. Under familiar contract prin-
ciples sellers who are bound by no obligations to continue selling to any buyers would
apparently be unaffected by the act. It should be applicable only to those business trans-
actions (lease sale or contract of sale) which carry with the transaction some sort of
continuing obligation on the part of the seller. It is only in this context that "condi-
tions, agreements or understandings" have meaning. Otherwise, each sale or contract
for sale is complete in and of itself at the time of the transaction. The words "condi-
tion" and "agreement" are familiar, reasonably well-settled terms of contract law.
"Understanding," to the extent that it partakes of the nature of agreement would be
nothing but a synonym. It could also mean, however, simple knowledge on the buyer's
part that the seller will refuse future sales to the buyer (should the buyer not conform
to certain conditions), such knowledge having been acquired from an announcement
to this effect made to the buyer by the seller. When sellers are obligated to future sales
and their obligations are conditioned on "understandings" that they may refuse future
sales if buyers fail to meet the "understood" conditions, such understandings do form
a part of the seller's obligations and clearly seem covered by section 3 Clayton. How-
ever, where no obligations to continue dealing exist, a seller's announced policy of his
intended future refusal to sell, provided buyers fail to observe seller-desired conditions,
would appear outside section 3 Clayton coverage. The text will show that the courts
do not all agree.
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it doesn't exist. Or, the courts may find concert between the seller
and some other party, thus bringing the refusal to deal under section
I Sherman as a concerted refusal resulting in an unreasonable re-
straint of trade.
In Governmental actions against sellers who choose this method
of controlling the activities of their buyers, the refusal to deal is
only the trigger to the suit. The threat to refuse dealing, which is
ever present while sales continue with buyers complying with the
coerced conditions, is the practice at which the Government action
is aimed. One can but speculate as to how many Government suits
against sellers would be successful if the facts proved showed no
exercise of the threat to refuse dealing, but did show the existence
of the threat and compliance with the required conditions by all
buyers. It is a bit ironic that the very freedom which Colgate ap-
pears to allow a seller to exercise is the identical thing he must be
very cautious not to exercise lest he be made a defendant under
section 3 Clayton and be adjudged a party to an agreement he never
made!
Relief from the existence of such threats can also be obtained by
private action. Treble damage actions brought by buyers probably
will not arise where the buyer has made no agreement with the
seller conditioning the buyer's activity, until the buyer is disad-
vantaged by actual exercise of the seller's threat to refuse dealing.
When cut off from his supply, the buyer retaliates by filing suit
against the seller, and it is then to the buyer's advantage to furnish
the court any "evidence" that an agreement existed in which the
conditions constituting a violation of section 3 Clayton were present.
Once the court is satisfied that this agreement exists, the court will
merge the refusal to deal into the illegality of the agreement and
find the refusal to deal to be the proximate cause of the buyer's
damage; the buyer will then be allowed to recover three times the
loss of profit he would have realized had his supply not been cut off.
A case illustrative of this point is Osborne v. Sinclair Refining
Co.6 This case had the dubious advantage of being discussed twice
by the same judge. Osborne represents the present state of the law
regarding refusals to deal motivated by unwillingness of a buyer
to meet certain conditions satisfactory to the seller. The conditions,
had they been a part of an agreement between buyer and seller,
would have made the agreement illegal under section 3 Clayton.
66 286 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1960) ; 324 F.2d 566 (4th Cir. 1963).
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Osborne, a retailer of Sinclair gasoline under a lease arrangement
which made no mention of any obligation by Osborne to purchase
Goodyear tires and accessories, was induced to purchase Goodyear
products under threat of cancellation of his lease. Upon Osborne's
failure to purchase a sufficient amount to satisfy Sinclair (who was
receiving a commission from Goodyear on amounts purchased by
Sinclair's lessees), the lease was summarily cancelled. During nego-
tiations for resumption of the lease, Osborne showed "good faith"
by ordering over $1000.00 worth of Goodyear products. Then the
lease was renewed. The new lease contained no agreement, to pur-
chase any amounts of Goodyear products, but Osborne was well
aware that failure to make satisfactory quantity purchases would
result in cancellation of the new lease. Osborne ignored the threat-
ened cancellation, and purchased only those amounts of Goodyear
products which he himself desired. When Sinclair again cancelled
the lease, Osborne retaliated with a treble damage suit charging
Sinclair with refusal to deal.
Judge Sobeloff reversed the district court which had found Sin-
clair's cancellation of the lease the simple exercise of a right to refuse
to deal within the purview of Colgate.67 Instead, he found Sinclair's
cancellation to be the "result of an arrangement" calculated to pres-
sure customers to accept tie-ins of other products, and thus a violation
of section 3 Clayton. On remand to the district court for determina-
tion of damages, the lower court found that the refusal to deal was
not the proximate cause of Osborne's damages, and only damages
actually resulting from the "arrangement" could be recovered by
Osborne.68 On the second appeal, Judge Sobeloff again reversed and
with respect to the substantive issue of violation said " .. . to the
contrary, irrespective of monopoly or conspiracy, if the seller pres-
sures his customers or dealers into adhering to resale price main-
tenance, or exclusive dealing or tie-ins, he has put together an un-
lawful arrangement and taken himself outside the narrow protection
afforded by Colgate."69 On the damage issue he concluded that the
cancellation of the lease was the proximate cause of the damage and
that the cancellation was the illegal act; consequently, the loss of
profits suffered by Osborne as a result of being cut off from his
source of supply was the proper measure of damages.
A few months earlier, this same judge had decided McElhenney
67 171 F. Supp. 37 (D. Md. 1959).
68 207 F. Supp. 856 (D. Md. 1962).
61) 324 F.2d at 573.
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Co. v. Western Auto Supply Co.,70 wherein the seller had refused
dealing with five buyers who failed to stop marketing television sets
obtained from a competitor of the seller. The judge found no agree-
ment by the buyers to restrict their retail purchases to Western Auto
products. Yet the facts were plainly apparent that Western Auto's
policy was to "full line force" 71 its retailers and refuse to deal with
those buyers who failed to comply. One commentator, somehow
conveniently ignoring Osborne, cites McElhenney as authority for
the proposition that" . . . [the seller] has the right to select dealers
who will devote their time and energies to selling his products." '72
An array of decisions exist wherein the basic pattern of refusing
to deal resulting from buyer failure to meet conditions of exclusive
dealing required by the seller as a condition of future sales pro-
duced no liability on the seller's part for the use of this business
tactic. Frequently cited are Nelson Radio and Supply v. Motorola
Inc.,73 Leo 1. Meyberg Co. v. Eureka Williams Corp.,74 United States
v. 1. I. Case Co.,75 Allied Equipment Co. v. Weber Engineering
Prod.,0 and Brosious v. Pepsi Cola Co.77 The dual requirements for
a violation of section 3 Clayton, (1) agreement (" . . . lease, sale,
contract for sale ... on condition") and (2) harm to competition
("... effect of which is to substantially lessen competition ... ")
are not always discussed in the cases. When the "agreement" ele-
ment is lacking, there is no need to discuss the "harm to competition"
element.
Since the courts found no violations in six of the seven above-cited
cases, whether the required harm to competition would have been
found had the courts first found an agreement is not known. Only
the 1. I. Case decision discussed the second requirement and found it
not present. Where requirement (1) is found to have existed either
70 287 F.2d 524 (4th Cir. 1960).
71 Full line forcing is no more than a seller's adoption of a policy of not selling to
buyers for resale unless they are willing to take all the variety of products which the
seller is offering for resale. If a buyer is unwilling to agree to such a policy the seller
refuses to accept him as a purchaser. Acceptance of the conditions will naturally induce
the buyer not to purchase from competitors of the seller to the extent that his needs
for inventory are adequately supplied by taking the full line offered by the original
seller.
72 Fulda, Individual Refusal to Deal: When Does Single.Firm Conduct Become,
Vertical Restraint? 30 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 590, 601 (1965).
73 200 F.2d 911, (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953).
74 215 F.2d 100 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 875 (1954).
75 101 F. Supp. 856 (D. Minn. 1951).
76 237 F.2d 879 (4th Cir. 1956).
77 155 F.2d 99 (3rd Cir. 1946).
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plainly or is manufactured by the court, the case must then be dis-
cussed in terms of meeting requirement (2).
In six of the seven cases cited above, the courts felt that the ex-
istence of a threat was not sufficient to meet the "agreement" re-
quirement of Clayton. Yet, there exists another line of cases with
substantially similar facts where violations of Clayton were found.
These cases include Carter Carburetor Corp. v. FTC,78 United States
v. Richfield Oil Corp.,79 Englander Motors Ine. v. Ford Motor Co.,80
and United States v. Sun Oil Co.81
Apparently, the theory of the four cases above would provide
immunity to the seller only when the buyer is not informed by the
seller of the conditions which, if breached, will result in the seller's
refusal to continue dealing. Is it reasonable to think that business
would be operated this way? In the absence of a threat (or at least
an announcement of an intention to refuse dealing upon failure of
the buyer to abide by certain conditions) the refusal comes as a com-
plete surprise to the buyer and does little good to the seller. To
accomplish his goal, the seller needs to inform the buyer in advance
of contemplated action in order to induce the buyer to comply, so
that refusal to deal will not become necessary. The fact that the
seller, with immunity, can refuse dealing for exactly the same motive,
i.e., he doesn't want to sell to buyers who purchase from competitors)
so long as he doesn't pressure his buyers by announced intentions of
future action makes a mockery of the decisions holding that the
seller loses his immunity whenever he refuses to deal after clearly
indicating to the buyers that refusal to deal will follow unacceptable
action by them.
The irrational nature of decisions holding sellers liable for treble
damages in cases where a violation of section 3 Clayton is alleged
due to refusal to deal after a buyer had been earlier threatened with
such refusal is further heightened by the reasoning in a recent United
States Supreme Court decision. In Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal
Co., 2 the seller was unwilling to continue sales though obligated to
do so by the existence of a contract to supply coal for twenty years.
The buyer was similarly obligated to purchase requirements and thus
inferentially was precluded from purchases from competitors of the
78 112 F.2d 722 (8th Cir. 1940).
79 343 U.S. 922 (1951).
80 293 F.2d 802 (6th Cir. 1961).
81 176 F. Supp. 715 (E.D. Pa. 1959).
82 365 U.S. 320 (1961).
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seller. In defense to the buyer's action for specific performance, the
seller claimed that his obligation to make future deliveries under
the contract was excused since the contract was illegal as a violation
of section 3 Clayton. The Court found the contract not to be illegal
because the contract failed to produce a substantial lessening of com-
petition. It is apparent from the Court's reasoning that bad the con-
clusion on this issue been to the contrary, the defense of refusal to
sell would have been upheld.
Why don't sellers defending treble damage suits resulting from
exercise of a threat to refuse to deal with customers who violate
stated conditions requiring that no purchases be made from the
seller's competitors simply admit that the threat was in reality an
"agreement," and defend the failure to sell on the grounds that no
obligation to sell arises out of an illegal contract? Perhaps the reason
is obvious-the buyer's suit does not seek specific performance of the
agreement to sell, but seeks treble damages for the seller's failure to
sell.
No clear cut cases exist wherein courts have required that sales
to customers must continue so long as customers make offers to
purchase. 83 Thus, buyers cannot obtain specific performance relief
in the form of a mandatory injunction to force continued selling for
so long as the buyer desires to make purchases. However, they can
collect for damages that have resulted from past refusals to sell,
but, as in the Osborne decision, the damages for such refusal to deal
will not extend beyond the date when normal termination of the
buyer-seller relationship would have occurred.84 In open-account
sales where the seller is not obligated to furnish products to buyers
for any prescribed period of time, measuring the cut off date for
damages caused by illegal refusals to sell seems an impossible task.
83 A number of consent decrees exist wherein the defendants have been enjoined
from refusing to sell to buyers where the refusal was based on buyer noncompliance
with an understood policy that they were not to purchase from competitors of the seller.
See, e.g., United States v. Bendix Aviation Corp., 1952-1953 Trade Cas. 68769 (S.D.-
N.Y. 1953) (braking systems); United States v. Mansfield Journal, 1952-1953 Trade
Cas. 67258 (N.D. Ohio 1952) (newspaper advertisements). Determining whether
future refusals to sell were motivated by noncompliance by buyers with seller-desired
anticompetitive conditions or were motivated by other permissible reasons would, at
best, be very difficult to prove.
84 This would seem to place the outer limit of damages recoverable in a refusal-to.
sell case as being only those damages from losses proximately caused by refusals that
preceded that point of time when the seller's normal obligation under the sales agree-
ment would have otherwise terminated. Absent long leases or long-term sales contracts,
such a limited deterrent may prove to be of slight value if the goal is to provide buyers
with assured sources of supply.
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Would a subsequent refusal which the seller could have exercised
be within the Colgate protection, as the seller's unlimited choice? Is
it significant that prior to the refusal the buyer had been a regular
customer? An offer to purchase made by a potential new buyer can be
refused by the potential seller, whether the refusal is based on the
belief that the buyer will not perform seller-desired conditions or
any other reason. This conclusion follows categorically from the fact
that a refusal to accept an offer to purchase is not concerted action
within section 1 Sherman, and a refusal to sell is not a "lease, con-
tract of sale, or a sale" within section 3 Clayton. Following a suc-
cessful Governmental injunctive action against a seller who has re-
fused to sell to a buyer who was unwilling to abide by conditions
which required refraining from making purchases from competitors
of the seller, will continued refusals give rise to liability for treble
damages? Can the Government then bring another action claiming
continued refusal? If the past refusal was illegal, why aren't the
continued refusals similarly illegal? The continued refusal to deal
could be considered as much an arrangement pressuring customers
into unacceptable conditions85 as was the past refusal for which the
seller was found in violation of law.
When, if ever, will continued or future refusals to deal be im-
mune under the Colgate doctrine-when the courts can conclude that
the subsequent refusals are individual, nonconcerted actions by the
seller? The difficulty lies in the fact that the continued refusals or
future refusals are no more concerted than were the past ones. De-
spite the fact that the present state of antitrust legislation does not
proscribe either type of refusal, some courts have held to the con-
trary. It is a dilemma of their own creation, motivated by an ad-
mittedly admirable desire to prohibit unreasonable restraints of
trade brought about by coercive threats, even though the restraint
is effected by single-enterprise action.
Sellers who sell a variety of products, one or more of which is
not as acceptable to their buyers as a competitive product, can force
acceptance of the less-desirable product by requiring it to be pur-
chased as a tie-in along with the more-desirable one. However, when
the required harmful effects on competition are present, contracts
between buyers and sellers in which buyers promise to purchase two
or more items as a package, when, but for the contract, the items
could normally have been purchased separately, are in violation of
85 Osborne v. Sinclair Refining Co., 324 F.2d at 573.
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section 3 Clayton.86 In an effort to circumvent the Act, some sellers
have attempted package sales (tie-ins) by means of accepting offers
to purchase only when such offers express a 'willingness to purchase
both items. The same detrimental effect on competition can result,
but simple refusal to sell the items separately becomes the means to
achieve the desired result, rather than through language in a contract
or agreement. Note that as early as 1920, the Federal Trade Com-
mission was rebuffed by the United States Supreme Court when the
Commission attempted to outlaw tie-ins, forced by seller refusal to
sell the items separately, as unfair competition. 7 The presence of a
contract or agreement containing the limitations that the sale can be
made only on condition of the buyer buying both items is easily
avoided. Refusal to sell unless the buyer is willing to purchase both
items is simply inherent in the offer to sell. No agreement or under-
standing is required for an announcement of "what" one is willing
to sell.
Nevertheless legal actions have been brought on the theory that such
single-enterprise action could be found to be in violation of section 1
Sherman."" Frequently, allegations of violations of section 2 Sher-
man 9 accompany complaints charging violations of section 1, since
individual action can clearly violate section 2. Then, attention quite
frequently is turned to whether unreasonable restraints have oc-
curred, with little attention given to the need for the concerted
action requirement of section 1. The option that any seller has, to
offer for sale two or more items as a package rather than sell the
items separately, is clearly an individual decision, not a concerted
one. If the offer is accepted and a sale results, the acceptance of the
packaged items does not arise from a contractual obligation; at the
time of purchase, the buyer was no more prevented by obligation
86 Though literally the condition that a buyer not purchase from the seller's com-
petitors is the impermissible condition of section 3 Clayton, the courts have concluded
that when a buyer agrees to purchase an item which he does not particularly desire
along with another item, the pressure of the combination will in effect prevent him
from purchasing the same item from the seller's competitor. Thus, tie-ins have become
one of the impermissible conditions that sellers may not include in the sales agreements
with their buyers.
87 FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421 (1920). Admittedly, a complete judicial review of
the Commission's conclusions that particular tactics adopted by businesses constitute
"unfair competition" has been overruled by FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. 294
(1966). It remains to be seen whether the Commission will now assume jurisdiction
over all refusals to deal that it finds anticompetitive although not in themselves violative
of section 3 Clayton.
88 Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
89 Ibid. (Monopoly charges were also brought by the Government against the news-
paper. The section 1 charges were later dropped.)
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from purchasing either the packaged or separate items from com-
petitors of the seller than he would have had the items been sold
separately. The refusal to sell except as a package is distinguishable
from a contract, the provisions of which require the buyer to purchase
in the future and obligate him to purchase "the package." Only in
this latter situation would there be a literal violation of section 3
Clayton. 0 Whether or not tie-ins tend to have the requisite harmful
effects on competition to make out a violation of the Sherman Act,
courts have uniformly agreed that the requisite harmful effect reg-
ularly results.91 This virtually unanimous acceptance of the principle
that the harmful effect to competition automatically results from tie-
ins, as it does from resale price maintenance, induces courts to over-
look the prerequisite of concert and find a violation of section 1
Sherman and section 3 Clayton without any serious attempt to dis-
tinguish concerted action from single-enterprise action.
92
2. Refusals Used to Coere Conditions Which May or May Not
Have the Effect of Producing Unreasonable Restraints of Trade
Geographic monopolies93 are created when sellers voluntarily re-
strict their sales to designated buyers within defined geographic
boundaries. Such buyers enjoy a franchise status, and marketing
specialists agree that benefits to both buyer and seller result. The re-
striction is accomplished by simply refusing to sell to other than the
designated buyers. If the agreement not to sell is formalized in a
90 But see note 86, supra.
91 Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949), "Tying
agreements serve hardly any purpose beyond suppression of competition." Standard Oil
Co. of California v. United States, supra at 305.
02 In private treble damage suits where proof of damage follows the conclusion that
a violation of section 1 Sherman or section 3 Clayton has occurred, a money judgment
is the form of relief. Osborn v. Sinclair Refining Co., 286 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1960).
Where the Government seeks to enjoin the continuance of the seller's alleged practice
of selling only on the understanding that the buyer will continue to purchase the tied
item, relief takes the form of an injunction which orders the seller to refrain from
requiring any agreement or understanding that the items must be purchased as a pack-
age. United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962). Neither form of relief goes so
far as to insist that the sale of the single item be made. Consent decrees exist where de-
fendants are required to sell single items-forced sales. Where such defendants are not
monopolies or attempting to become so, their refusals to sell single items are, of course,
nonconcerted activity, and any mandatory injunction requiring single-item sales appears
to be based solely on a court's dislike of the reason for the refusal.
93 This term is used to mean that prospective repurchasers have fewer alternative
sources of supply for the seller's product than they would if the seller would allow
multiple distributors to resell the product within the defined geographic boundaries. If
retailing is to be considered a line of commerce, and thus should operate competitively,
then sufficient retailers must exist within limited geographic boundaries to give con-
sumers alternative sources of supply for the same product.
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contract, the refusal to sell to a subsequent buyer clearly is obligated
by contract and hence is concerted action. There remains only the
further requirement-that the refusal to sell produce an unreasonable
restraint of trade-to effect a violation of section I Sherman. But,
attacks on franchising have been uniformly unsuccessful, the courts
refusing to find an unreasonable restraint of trade. 4 Of course, the
inability of the potential buyer to obtain the product from the seller
completely eliminates the potential buyer as a competitor in the
franchisee's line of commerce. If the seller, instead of completely
eliminating a franchisee's competitor by refusal to sell, had sold to
him under threats to refuse further sales if certain noncompetitive
conditions of resale were not observed (such as resale price main-
tenance), all courts would conclude that a per se unreasonable re-
straint is produced. What seems clearly inconsistent is that elimin-
ating a potential competitor completely from a line of commerce
universally is held not to be an unreasonable restraint of trade,
whereas allowing one or more competitors to exist, but only under
the threat that the competitor must conform to certain noncompeti-
tive behavior, is per se unreasonable. Whether foreclosing resellers
from competing by refusing to sell to them produces an unreasonable
restraint of trade is a controversial and difficult matter which remains
today and will forever remain essentially an economic, not a legal
dispute. Holdings, however, that restraints effected by franchising
(which result almost universally from agreement), cannot possibly be
unreasonable because such actions are "justifiable business activity."
may be predicated on the unsure premise that franchising activity is
individual action rather than concerted action. If this is true, such
holdings preclude investigations into the very area with which
economic policy, as expressed in the antitrust laws, is concerned.
Section 3 Clayton is not available as a proscriptive device to pro-
hibit franchising, since the particular provisions of the statute are
limited to situations where the buyer rather than the seller is the
94 That is, refusal to sell to one who has never been a purchaser, which refusal was
obligated action by the seller because of a preexisting franchise contract with another
buyer, or the reduction of distribution outlets by a seller whose decision is unilateral or
results from an agreement with the distribution outlet he decides to retain, results in
no violation of section 1 Sherman. Schwing Motor Co. v. Hudson Sales Corp., 138 F.
Supp. 899, a/I'd per curiam, 239 F.2d 176 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 823
(1957). But cf., Hub Auto Supply, Inc. v. Automatic Radio Mfg. Co., 173 F. Supp.
396 (D. Mass. 1959). See also McKesson and Robbins, Inc. v. Charles Pfizer & Co.,
1964 Trade Cas. 80193 (E.D. Pa.); United States v. Stamps-Conhaim-Whitehead, Inc.,
1963 Trade Cas. 78472 (N.D. Iowa) (consent decree).
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restrained party.95 Ironically, a franchise granted by a seller to one
buyer, though literally only prohibiting the seller from making sales
to competitors of the franchisee-buyer, also operates as a restrictive
device on other potential buyers from the seller. Thus, a franchise is
a substitute for buyer coercion of the seller not to sell to competitors
of the buyer.
Whether the seller by voluntary agreement restricts himself from
making sales to others or whether the inducement for refusals to sell
to others comes from customer coercion makes little difference with
respect to the presence or absence of an unreasonable restraint of
trade. The restraint effected is the same--the competition among
potential resellers of the product is inhibited.
Many sales agreements accompanying franchises contain reciprocal
promises by buyers that they will restrict their resales to certain
geographic areas or to specialized customer classifications. In recent
cases where such limitations on the freedom of the resellers to com-
pete were incorporated in the contract, the courts have refused to
condemn the restrictions as per se unreasonable; however, they rec-
ognize that this restraint could be unreasonable and should be
determined by applying the rule of reason.96 Sellers who fear in-
vestigation of the restrictions they place on their resellers can exercise
their refusal to deal selectively, and can make sales only to those who
comply. In this manner, sellers could avoid any determination that
the vertical restraint was unreasonable, since the method of effecting
the restraint would be nonconcerted action.
Many other reasons for refusal to sell to potential resellers have
been advanced by sellers, ranging in the spectrum from simple dis-
satisfaction with the methods the buyer was using to promote or
advertise the product, to refusals exercised to retain goodwill of
other customers of the seller.9 7
95 The specific provisions of section 3 Clayton are directed at seller-desired restric-
tions on buyers to which buyers agree, and not to buyer-desired restrictions on sellers to
which sellers agree.
96 White Motor Co. v. United States 372 U.S. 253 (1963); Sandura Co. v. FTC,
339 F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1964).
97 Though undoubtedly sellers have come up with many new reasons for refusing
to sell to potential or existing customers for resale, a long list of reasons given for
such refusal, where litigation developed as a result of the refusal, can be found in
Barber, Refusals to Deal Under the Federal Antitrust Laws 103 U. PA. L. -nv. 847,
857-58 (1955).
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The case of Klors, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc.,"8 where the
retention of the goodwill of other customers was the motivation for
refusal to deal, provides an interesting comparison to a hypothetical
case of individual refusal to deal. In that case, two or more sellers
combined and conspired with two or more competitors of Klors,
resulting in a termination of sales to Klors. Here we clearly have a
barrel full of conspirators and no problem with the concert require-
ment. If we assume that all features of Klors are present except that:
(1) only one seller existed, (2) and that this seller had conversations
with Klors' competitors at the request of the competitors, (3) but
promised the competitors nothing as a result of the meetings, (4)
and then later cut off sales to Klors-what then? Is such a cutting off
of sales to Klors an unreasonable restraint? Is it not apparent that the
effect on competition which the court felt met the test of unreason-
ableness in Klors is equally produced in our hypothetical?
The fact situation in the hypothetical appears to differ very little
from the case of Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co. 0
There, the seller (Packard), after consultation with one of its
Baltimore resellers, decided to discontinue sales to the two other
resellers in that city. The circuit court of appeals held that this
decision to refuse to deal created no unreasonable restraint of trade.
Whether the test for proscribing undesirable economic activity is a
probability of "substantially lessen[ing] competition," or the presence
of an "unreasonable restraint of trade," the inability to obtain in-
ventory of a product which a buyer-reseller desires to sell, caused by
a seller's refusal to deal, calls for an application of either one test or
the other. Since section 1 Sherman and section 3 Clayton presently
require concert or agreement, one is left with great doubts in reading
the opinions of courts whether the immunity enjoyed by businesses
who refuse to deal with customers stems from the form of the refusal,
or the failure of that refusal to produce economic situations that meet
the requisite harm to competition.
UNCONDITIONAL REFUSALS TO DEAL0 0
Whether there has been prior dealing, or whether the seller re-
fuses the first attempt by a buyer to purchase, unconditional refusals
98 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
99 243 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir.), ceri. denied, 355 U.S. 822 (1957).
100 A former writer classifies these refusals as "arbitrary refusals." Barber writes
that an arbitrary refusal is not reached by the Sherman Act. They are not purposeful
he says and cannot be conspiratorial for a conspiracy must have an object. Barber,
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to deal have always enjoyed immunity from the proscriptions of sec-
tion 1 Sherman and section 3 Clayton. Where the seller has never
been obligated by contract to make sales, or where such obligation did
exist but is at an end through natural termination, the seller's decision
not to sell to the prospective buyer, which decision is not dependent
on any performable conditions by the buyer, simply results in no
sales, despite the desire of the buyer to make purchases. A seller, who
is not attempting to whip into line a reseller who is breaching under-
stood conditions of remaining a reseller, can decide instead to simply
limit his distribution outlets. He apparently can be motivated to
make this decision by the urgings of his customer's competitors. Such
urgings might well have arisen from cozy conversations with those
competitors, thus leading one to believe that the seller had actually
promised that he would limit his resellers to the ones so promised.10 1
The economic restraint of trade resulting from an unconditional
refusal to deal is the unavailability of the goods of one seller for
purchase (and subsequent resale) by one buyer. The restraint of
trade resulting from the exercise of a threat to refuse to deal (where
the threat is used to condition resales by the buyer under anticom-
petitive conditions) also results in unavailability of the goods of one
seller for purchase (and subsequent resale) by one buyer. If the
courts were concerned in both cases with the effect of the actual
refusal, the economic restraints would be the same. It is clear that
in the case where the refusal would not have occurred if the buyers
had been willing to abide by the conditions desired by the seller,
the courts have concentrated on the noncompetitive conditions that
the threat of refusal to deal sustains, rather than the restraint that the
exercise of the threat creates. The only weapon of the courts in such
cases is to take the sting out of the threat by removing its potency,
i.e., making it illegal. This they have done, and it is the only rational
explanation for the different attitude they have expressed between
unconditional and conditional refusals to deal.
supra note 97, at 849. An obvious purpose exists with an "unconditional' (arbitrary)
refusal. It is to preclude the potential buyer from obtaining the goods for resale. To
eliminate consideration of whether such a purpose, accomplished by refusal to deal,
unreasonably restrains trade is to beg the question. The fact that such a refusal may
not have as its purpose the maintenance of other anticompetitive conditions of resale
is not sufficient to preclude consideration of the effect it does have.
101 If obliged as a result of the conversations to cut off any buyers, the refusals
which followed were clearly concerted and not unilateral. Section 1 Sherman's first
requisite is present. All emphasis should then be placed on whether an unreasonable
restraint was effected. Discussions as to justifiable business reasons for limiting dis-
tributors or the right of sellers to individually pick and choose to whom they will sell
becomes out of place.
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Emotions may sometimes provide a stronger motivation than a
desire for profit maximization and induce a businessman to refuse
dealing. Illustrative of this point are two cases in which sellers who
were sued by their buyers on charges of having violated sections of
the Robinson-Patman Act and section 2 Sherman reacted to the suits
by ceasing further sales to the buyers-plaintiffs. Whether one could
properly classify these refusals to deal as unconditional is doubtful,
because presumably, the dropping of the suits against the sellers
might have been sufficient to cause resumption of sales. The cases
are included here primarily to indicate the difference of opinion which
exists, as yet unresolved, as to whether refusals so motivated can be
enjoined. At the district court level, opposite results were reached in
the two cases. In House of Materials Inc. v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 10
2
decided in the southern district of New York, the seller was enjoined;
pending the determination of buyer's suit, from refusing to sell to the
buyer. Refusing to sell, used coercively to induce a buyer to drop a
legitimate antitrust claim against the seller, was thought to be a
sufficient reason to enjoin such a coercive tactic. Reversing, the circuit
court of appeals found the refusal to sell to be nothing more than the
exercise by the seller of his unilateral power to choose to whom he
would sell. Accordingly, the court held that this choice was within
the protection of Colgate.
10 3
On the other hand, in Bergen Drug Co. v. Parke-Davis & Co.104
the district court for New Jersey, well aware of the earlier New
York district court opinion that granted an injunction, disagreed
with that result and held that a seller should not be enjoined
from selling to a buyer who is suing the seller for violation of
the Robinson-Patman Act and section 2 Sherman. 10 5 On appeal,
rather ironically, this decision was also reversed, the Third Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals holding that a seller could be enjoined
pendente lite from refusing to sell to the buyer.10 The court of
appeals emphasized that the charge of monopoly in the main suit
might result in a permanent injunction against the defendant-seller
requiring his continued sales to the buyer, and that until this deter-
mination was reached an equity court could restore the selling rela-
tionship to the status quo that had existed before the buyer had
102 191 F. Supp. 55 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (P. W. Husserl, Inc. v. Simplicity Pattern
Co.).
103 298 F. 2d 867 (2d Cir. 1962).
104 1961 Trade Cas. 78583 (D.N.J.).
105 Charges of monopolization were a part of the plaintiff's complaint.
106 307 F.2d 725 (1962).
[Vol. 4
ANTITRUST REFUSALS TO DEAL
brought his suit against the seller. Absent a monopoly charge, it is of
course the writer's thesis that both refusals resulted from single-enter-
prise action and therefore were not proscribed by section 1 Sherman
or section 3 Clayton; thus, a temporary or permanent injunction
would be inappropriate. It certainly is open to serious doubt whether
any monopoly charge against Parke-Davis & Co. could be proved.0 7
As mentioned earlier in the text, private plaintiffs as well as govern-
ment prosecutors have a tendency to draft their complaints on a
"throw the book at them" manner in hopes of stirring up enough
antipathy to obtain a favorable decision. Unfortunate as it may be
that a buyer possessed of a good cause of action in antitrust against
his seller is coerced into dropping it by the seller's unwillingness to
continue sales to him unless he will drop the suit, such coercion is
nowhere proscribed in section 1 Sherman or section 3 Clayton. It
should be recognized that the reason a seller gives for his refusal to
sell should not be examined by the courts to determine whether the
seller's conduct is proscribed. The seller's reasons notwithstanding,
present legislation does not proscribe single-enterprise action, even
if harm to competition results therefrom. Thus, the need for a change
in the present legislation is apparent if courts are to protect against
harm to competition resulting from unilateral action.
BUYER REFUSAL TO DEAL AS A POTENTIAL VIOLATION
OF EXISTING ANTITRUST LEGISLATION
Buyers who possess sufficient economic power to coerce their
suppliers into compliance with buyer-desired conditions have used,
less frequently than sellers, refusal to buy as their coercive tactic.
As early as 1924, the United States Supreme Court disagreed with
the Federal Trade Commission and concluded that a buyer's refusal
to buy was unproscribed by Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act which prohibited "unfair competition." 1°8 Refusals to buy
were considered actionable under section 1 Sherman only when buyers
acted in concert with others.0 9 However, the dearth of reported cases
107 Too many competitive drug companies exist, and the uniqueness which any
patented drug may enjoy as a result of the patent is a legalized monopoly.
108 FTC v. Raymond Bros.-Clark Co., 263 U.S. 565 (1924) (The buyer's refusal
here was an attempt to coerce the seller to refuse to sell to the buyer's competitor).
Quaere: If the seller had succumbed to the coercion and refused to sell to the buyer's
competitor, would his refusal be actionable under Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act or section 1 Sherman?
109 Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600
(1914) (concert); Whitely v. Foremost Dairies, Inc., 151 F. Supp. 914 (W.D.
Ark. 1957) (no violation for lack of concert); Greenspun v. McCarran, 105 F. Supp.
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involving individual refusals of buyers to buy may indicate the rela-
tive lack of buyer bargaining power. In one case where the buyer
possessed a strong market position, and where the tactic of refusal
to buy was used as a method to coerce sellers, the tactic was held
illegal."10 The decision is weakened as representing a pure case of
unilateral refusal to buy in that the defendants were characterized
as in concert with each other, though all were subsidiaries of a single
company. Absent monopoly charges, or an expanded definition of
concert, unilateral refusals to buy have not resulted in violation of
section 1 Sherman, and basing a prosecution on the strict language
of section 3 Clayton appears particularly inappropriate."' If one
admits that unilateral refusals to buy can be equally as restraint-pro-
ducing when used coercively by a strong buyer against weak sellers,
as when used by a strong seller against weak buyers, the need for
proscription of this business tactic is equally great.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The implementation of any legislative policy which permits murder
while prohibiting assault will produce doctrinal inconsistency. The
present language of section 1 Sherman and section 3 Clayton permits
single-enterprise refusal to deal, while prohibiting agreement" 2 hav-
ing as its objective the maintenance of noncompetitive conditions.
Although deterred by the sanctions provided by statute where the
maintenance of noncompetitive conditions is effected through agree-
ment, the seller-or-buyer-desired conditions may be achieved with
immunity through exercise of the unprohibited power of refusing to
deal. When the policy goals of preventing noncompetitive activity
outweigh the limitations of the proscriptive legislation, courts will
be inclined to distort the limitations. The willingness to distort and
the degree of distortion varies. This produces the array of irrecon-
cilable decisions.
Enlarging the proscriptive provisions of section 1 Sherman and
section 3 Clayton to encompass single-enterprise activity which results
662 (D. Nev. 1952) (concert~existed and the relief granted was forced-purchasing) ;
United States v. Minneapolis Electrical Contractors Ass'n, 1954 Trade Cas. 69379 (D.
Minn.) (no violation due to lack of concert).
110 United States v. The New York Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 173 F.2d
79 (7th Cir. 1949).
111 No possible interpretation of the section would prohibit a buyer from exercising
a right to refuse purchases from a seller.
112 The actual words used in the statutes are: Sherman (contract, combination,
conspiracy) ; Clayton (condition, agreement, understanding).
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in the creation of an unreasonable restraint of trade or the tendency
to substantially lessen competition will allow the courts to concentrate
on the real reason for the existence of antitrust laws. Preservation of
competitive conditions where no countervailing social policies com-
pete demands that substance take precedence over form. The only
countervailing social policy seems to be the combined reluctance of
businessmen to willingly accept restrictions on their individual de-
cision-making power. It hardly seems necessary to point out that this
is political power, not economic good sense.
Amendment of section 1 Sherman to include the prohibition of
single-enterprise activity is not technically difficult. The addition of
the italicized words in the following suggested wording would
accomplish the desired results:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, con-
spiracy, or single-enterprise activity in restraint of trade or com-
merce ... is hereby declared to be illegal. . . Every person
who shall make any contract, engage in any combination or con-
spiracy, or engage in any single-enterprise activity hereby declared
to be illegal shall be guilty of a misdemeanor ....
Current economic policy, as reflected in legislation, has already
recognized the need to prohibit special anticompetitive conditions
when the probability of a substantial lessening of competition is
present, or a tendency towards monopoly is present. However, amend-
ment of section 3 Clayton is also necessary so that single-enterprise
activity which produces the special anticompetitive conditions can
also be proscribed. A suggestion for amendatory language is illus-
trated by the italicized words in the version below:
That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in
the course of such commerce, to lease or make a sale or contract
for sale of goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other
commodities, whether patented or unpatented, for use, consump-
tion, or resale within the United States or any territory thereof or
the District of Columbia or any insular possession or other place
under the jurisdiction of the United States, or fix a price charged
therefor, or discount from, or rebate upon, such price, on condition,
agreement, or understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof
shall not deal in the goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, sup-
plies, or other commodity of a competitor or competitors of the
lessor or seller, or to refuse to lease or sell or contract for sale
because an intended or existing lessee or buyer either, refuses to
agree to, or fails to comply with, an announced or unannounced
condition requiring that he not use or deal in the goods, wares,
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merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other commodity of a com-
petitor or competitors of the lessor or seller, where the effect of
such lease, sale, or contract for sale on" 3 such condition, agree-
ment, or understanding, or the refusal to lease or sell or contract
for sale because of failure to agree to, or comply with the an-
nounced or unannounced condition may be to substantially lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce.
The two amendments suggested above would retain the test of
unreasonable restraint of trade for all single-enterprise activity, as
section 1 Sherman presently does with respect to concerted activity.
To the extent that the restraint effected by the single-enterprise ac-
tivity was identical to that formely held per se unreasonable when
concertedly produced, a similar per se characterization would result
from single-enterprise restraint. Where, however, the stricter tests
of probability of substantial lessening of competition or tendency
to create a monopoly have been used in section 3 Clayton, the single-
enterprise activity consisting of refusal to deal has been singled out
as being the most comparable method of effecting the restraint pres-
ently prohibited by the section. Single-enterprise activity which pro-
duced restraints of the variety not presently proscribed by section 3
Clayton would still remain immune unless they met the more severe
test of unreasonable restraint.
Whether or not the treble damage remedy presently available to
private plaintiffs would be a sufficient deterrent to the tactic of
refusal to deal is debatable. As indicated earlier in the text, measur-
ing damages for refusal to deal presents serious difficulties where
open-account selling exists. Should buyers be able to obtain injunctive
relief which requires sellers to sell when the refusal to deal was
based on buyer noncompliance with the anticompetitive conditions?
Is it not enough that the buyer is willing to pay the seller's demanded
price? If buyers stand ready to pay the demanded price, sellers should
be able to avoid forced sales only on proof that their refusals are not
based on maintenance of noncompetitive conditions that amount to
113 The writer's substitution of "on" for the word "or" at this point is uncon-
nected with the theme of this article. It is intended to correct what is felt to be an
error in the original intention of the drafters of section 3. From a reading of the
section it would appear that the legislation is designed to make unlawful only certain
leases, sales, or contract for sales, i.e., only those that contain conditions, agreements,
or understandings which restrict the buyer from buying from the seller's competitors
and furthermore only those leases, sales, and contracts for sales which have such
conditions as a part of the transaction and which produce the necessary harmful effects
to the economy. Therefore it seems grammatically more correct to prohibit the trans-
action (lease, sale, or contract for sale) only when the transaction contains the un.
desired condition. The use of "on" will effect this result.
[Vol. 4
ANTITRUST REFUSALS TO DEAL
unreasonable restraints. Sellers would still be able to refuse sales
where the desired buyer conduct was unconnected with unreasonable
restraints. All refusals would be subject to the properly applied eco-
nomic tests, depending on the conditions which such refusals were
attempting to induce. Even where the refusal was unconditional, it
could still be examined to determine whether a line of commerce had
been unreasonably restrained.
Should refusals to buy be similarly treated? The normal ex-
change a buyer offers is money. A seller, on the other hand, offers
a product and a buyer's refusal to buy involves a complicated evalua-
tion of the worth of the seller's product as compared with alter-
natives. Policing buyer refusal to buy, with the attendant problems
of determining whether the refusal was based on attempts to corece
sellers to accept noncompetitive conditions rather than the simple
conclusion that the buyer had better alternatives, would be difficult
at best. Perhaps the treble damage remedy available to sellers who
could show a causal relationship between the buyer's refusal to buy
and the creation of anticompetitive conditions would be a sufficient
deterrent.
Alternative solutions to the general problem considered in this
article have been offered by other writers. At one extreme some con-
clude that vertical restraints are not sufficiently unreasonable as anti-
competitive devices to require proscription.1 - That solution, of
course, is directed primarily at what its supporters feel is a long-
continued economic misconception of the effects of vertical restraints
held by legislators, economists, courts and commentators.115 Long-
standing conceptions deserve constant reexamination to prevent them
from becoming immutable postulates. To date, the writer is uncon-
vinced that vertical restraints are harmless. However, he is in greater
disagreement with those whose solutions admit, as he does, that such
restraints are harmful, but who refuse to acknowledge that this fea-
ture should be the only prerequisite to proscription. When there
already exist well-recognized, though admittedly complex tests for
proscription ("unreasonable restraint of trade"--"to substantially
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of com-
merce"), introducing phrases like "business justification,""' 6 "of-
114 Bork, supra note 25; Adams, supra note 43.
115 Bork, Vertical Integration and the Sherman Act: The Legal History of an-
Economic Misconception, 22 U. C.. L. REv. 157 (1954).
116 Fulda, supra note 72, at 605. ("The cases sanctioning refusals to deal for reasons
not connected with resale price maintenance concern less sensitive areas where it is
much easier to find business justification for the refusal.") (Emphasis added.)
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fensive,"'117 "normal incidents of the enjoyment of that trade freedom
which has been a unique characteristic of our economic system" '118
as substitute tests simply because the restraint-producing activity
is single-enterprise action rather than concerted action, falls wide of
the mark. Those who are willing to recognize that our present well-
accepted tests for proscribing anticompetitive activity should be
equally applied whether the activity is single-enterprise or concerted,
but who are content with the irreconcilable attempts of our courts to
characterize single-enterprise activity as concerted, seem unaware that
in this process economically desired policy goals are lost in the
confusion.
The simple amendments suggested above would eliminate the need
for the hypocritical mischaracterization appearing in the court de-
cisions and would provide the Government with the power to pro-
hibit anticompetitive activity consistent with our overall antitrust
goals. If an additional deterrent to such activity is thought necessary,
it could be provided by legislation which authorizes private plaintiffs
to obtain forced sales or purchases from defendants.
117 Alexander, Private Antitrust Actions for Refusal to Deal, 6 ST. Louis U.L.J.
489, 505 (1961), ("Absent an offensive condition on continued dealing, a supplier
should feel safe in choosing his customers.") (Emphasis added.)
118 Barber, supra note 97, at 885 ("Unilateral refusals to deal where considerations
of monopoly are not involved are normal incidents of the enjoyment of that trade
freedom which has been a unique characteristic of our economic system.") (Emphasis
added.) Also he states, "If the conspiracy requirement should be read out of Section 1,
[Sherman] any firm which refused to sell to any person would do so at the peril that
the effect of the refusal would on suit by such person be found unreasonably to have
restrained trade." This writer adds-and why shouldn't he be if that is the effect of
his activity.
